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Abstract 
∎ Agriculture is central to the stability of Tunisia’s economy and society. 
The new Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) under 
negotiation with the EU offers opportunities for the agricultural sector, 
but also presents risks for the country as a whole. 
∎ Within Tunisia there is strong emotional resistance to the DCFTA. Its 
intensity is comparable to the strength of feeling against the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) in Germany a few years ago. 
∎ In addition to criticisms of specific topics in the talks, a string of issues 
fuel this categorical rejection: wariness of European dominance; negative 
experiences with transformations in the agricultural sector, especially 
in relation to land ownership; as well as the tradition – prevalent across 
North Africa – of securing food security through protectionist trade 
policy. 
∎ Sustainability impact assessments demonstrate positive welfare effects on 
growth and standard of living – but many concerns about ecological and 
social repercussions appear justified. Such negative effects can be avoided 
through concrete solutions within the agreement, and even better through 
appropriate Tunisian policies. 
∎ The EU can address the categorical rejection by almost all stakeholders in 
Tunisia through better communication during negotiations. As well as 
appealing for commitment and responsibility on the Tunisian side, it will 
be important to approach Tunisian sensitivities with awareness and 
respect. 
∎ Above all, Tunisian researchers should be more involved in DCFTA sus-
tainability impact assessments and participate in public debate on these 
studies. 
∎ Regardless of the success or failure of the talks, Tunisian agriculture 
needs to be promoted and developed. The organic sector offers great ex-
port opportunities and attractive employment opportunities for young 
people. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
A Stable Countryside for a Stable Country? 
The Effects of a DCFTA with the EU on 
Tunisian Agriculture 
Tunisia has long enjoyed a special political relation-
ship with the European Union. In 1995 it was the first 
Maghreb country to conclude an association agree-
ment with the EU. The so-called Arab Spring, Islamist 
terrorism and migration movements across the Mediter-
ranean have only added to the political significance 
of Tunisia, and of North Africa as a whole. From 
the perspective of the EU, and especially Germany, 
Tunisia is a beacon of democracy and economic trans-
formation in the region. It is a bilateral partner in the 
G20’s Compact with Africa, and discussed as a poten-
tial partner for the EU’s proposed migration agree-
ments. Trade policy plays a central role in these com-
prehensive approaches – and needs to align with 
foreign policy and development action. Within these 
frames economic policies to promote important sec-
tors like agriculture represent a significant aspect. 
Tunisia’s rural areas and agriculture are of particu-
lar economic, social and ecological importance to the 
country and its social and political stability. A flour-
ishing agricultural sector built on functioning rural 
infrastructure can do more than just offer employ-
ment. It can also create perspectives for young adults, 
helping to avoid rural-urban migration, violent unrest 
and radicalisation. 
The EU has been negotiating a Deep and Compre-
hensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with Tunisia 
since 2015, along the same lines as its agreements 
with Eastern European states. Unlike the existing 
association agreements from the late 1990s, a DCFTA 
involves a significant reciprocal market opening 
for the hitherto heavily protected agricultural sector. 
The envisaged DCFTA has encountered stiff resist-
ance from Tunisian civil society, the media sphere, 
and even in government circles. The intensity of 
push-back is comparable to the campaign against the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
in Germany and Europe. 
What potential benefits does a deep and compre-
hensive trade agreement offer for the strategically 
important agricultural sector? And what risks would 
be involved? Can the reservations of Tunisian actors 
be overcome? Or would alternative forms of support 
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for rural areas be better suited to promoting economic, 
social and ecological stability? 
On the basis of published sustainability impact 
assessments and Tunisian positions on the proposed 
agreement, the following recommendations can be 
formulated: 
∎ Tunisian reservations concerning liberalisation 
of agricultural trade need to be taken seriously. 
Agriculture is intimately bound up with sensi-
tive Tunisian interests. Security of food supply 
has always been a central political objective, and 
is traditionally pursued by using domestically 
produced rather than imported food. Economic 
reforms have in the past been exploited for pri-
vate enrichment, and some on the Tunisian side 
fear that a DCFTA could reproduce that negative 
experience. More broadly, market liberalisation 
runs counter to Tunisia’s still rather protectionist-
leaning economic concept. The potential risks of 
market opening need to be noted during the nego-
tiations and where appropriate addressed by means 
of safeguard clauses. As comparable EU agreements 
demonstrate, offering such protections is an abso-
lutely routine matter. Specific advantageous 
arrangements should also be found for individual 
products such as Tunisia’s symbolic national 
product, olive oil. 
∎ In its communication during the negotiations the 
EU should underline both Tunisia’s sovereignty 
and its responsibility, and demand commitment. 
The Tunisian side’s repeated – but unjustified – 
criticisms that the effects of trade liberalisation 
have not yet been investigated for Tunisia or have 
shown strategic advantages for the EU lack empiri-
cal evidence and need to be firmly refuted. Open 
forums for joint discussion about the numerous 
existing studies and targeted explicit inclusion of 
Tunisian researchers in this discourse would create 
opportunities to demonstrate respect, strengthen 
ownership and objectify the debate. 
∎ If the full benefits of expanded trade are to be felt, 
advances outside of the trade agreement will also 
be required. This includes promoting further pro-
gress on governance like rule of law and improving 
the quality of the institutions. 
∎ Finally, exit strategies need to be developed for the 
eventuality of the negotiations failing. That means 
open-ended dialogue respecting the Tunisian nego-
tiating position, rather than ramping up the pres-
sure. If consensus proves impossible, the DCFTA 
talks can be suspended and resumed at a later 
more favourable juncture. However the talks turn 
out, rural areas should be given support in the 
scope of diverse existing approaches, completely 
independently of the DCFTA. 
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Rural areas play a crucial economic, social and also 
ecological role in Tunisia – as they do across the 
whole of North Africa. They are home to one-third 
of Tunisia’s population and provide work for about 
15 percent of the population. Agriculture contributes 
10 percent of GDP, making it even larger than the 
important tourism sector. Tourism collapsed in 2015 
after terrorist attacks specifically targeting visitors, 
with knock-on effects for a nascent economic recov-
ery.1 Agriculture on the other hand fulfils a stabilis-
ing function especially in situations of economic 
crisis, not only securing the food supply but also less 
sensitive to economic fluctuations.2 Food prices are a 
fundamental and decisive factor for popular satisfac-
tion with the political system. Tunisia has regularly 
experienced violent demonstrations against rising 
food prices. 
This lends the agricultural sector great economic 
significance, with immediate socially stabilising 
effects. At the same time Tunisia’s agriculture faces 
diverse economic, social and ecological challenges. 
Economic Features of Note 
Tunisia is characterised by a sharp divide between its 
Mediterranean and desert climate zones. Extensive 
farming is concentrated in the north and centre; in 
the Saharan south agriculture is restricted to date 
 
1 Tunisian data is sometimes of dubious reliability. The best 
extensive and reliable sources are World Bank Data, GDP 
Growth (Annual %) – Tunisia, https://data.worldbank.org/ 
indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2018&locations=TN& 
start=2004 (accessed 12 July 2019), and Economist Intel-
ligence Unit, Tunisia Country Report (London and New York, 
April 2019). 
2 Bettina Rudloff, Die Saat geht nicht auf: EU-Handels- und  
-Agrarpolitik können strukturelle Fluchtursachen nicht beseitigen, 
sondern allenfalls abfedern, SWP-Aktuell 5/2017 (Berlin: Stif-
tung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2017), 4. 
growing. The growth rate of agricultural productivity 
has risen from just 0.8 percent in the 1980s to 2.5 per-
cent in 2013, principally through an increase in labour 
productivity.3 Agricultural and industrial productivity 
are similarly poor.4 Numerous factors inhibit a fur-
ther increase in productivity, including low mechani-
sation, poor quality seed and an ageing rural popu-
lation.5 
Tunisia is Africa’s second-largest 
exporter of organic 
agricultural products. 
The largely extensive nature of Tunisian farming 
offers great potential for organic production. After 
Tanzania, Tunisia is Africa’s second-largest exporter 
of organic agricultural products (and twenty-fourth 
globally). There are about three thousand certified 
producers, working largely for export; the main prod-
ucts are olive oil, dates, almonds, oranges, dried fruit, 
spices and honey. The certified organic share of agri-
cultural exports to the EU has risen continuously from 
about 2 percent in 2006 to more than 13 percent in 
2016.6 But with just 1.4 percent of agricultural land 
 
3 Jose Luis Figueroa, Mai Mahmoud and Hoda El-Enbaby, 
The Role of Agriculture and Agro-processing for Development in 
Tunisia, MENA Regional Program Working Paper 9 (Washing-
ton, D.C., and Cairo: International Food Policy Research Insti-
tute [IFPRI], April 2018), 12. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Institut Tunisien des Etudes Stratégiques (ITES), La Tunisie 
et l’Accord de libre-échange complet et approfondi (ALECA, secteur 
agricole) (Carthage, 2019), 3. 
6 Calculated using data from Direction Générale de l’Agri-
culture Biologique (DGAB), Forschungsinstitut für biologi-
schen Landbau (FiBL), United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), UNCTADstat, Eurostat. 
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currently under organic cultivation, the potential for 
further increase is regarded as high.7 
There are important differences between product 
groups, however. One-third of olive oil production is 
already organic;8 for exports the figure is 42 percent, 
most of which goes to the United States.9 On the other 
hand organic farming accounts for just 0.3 percent of 
the land used to grow fruit and vegetables;10 for toma-
toes the share is even smaller.11 
Growth in the agricultural sector is inhibited by 
a string of peculiarities of the market structure: 
Fragmented, monopolised and access-restricting market 
structure: Tunisian farming ranges from large-scale 
modern operations, primarily in the export sectors, 
to traditional family farms with less than two hec-
tares that are often poorly integrated into market 
structures.12 Access to production and marketing 
infrastructure is also poor in some regions. This in 
turn hinders the use of cold chains, which are espe-
cially important for storing fruit and vegetables as 
relevant Tunisian export sectors. This leads to large 
post-harvest losses. Across North Africa such losses 
accounted for up to 50 percent of the fruit and veg-
etable harvest in 2014; the equivalent figure for 
 
7 Helga Willer and Julia Lernoud, eds., The World of Organic 
Agriculture: Statistics and Emerging Trends 2017 (Frick and Bonn: 
Research Institute of Organic Agriculture [FiBL] and Inter-
national Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements 
[IFOAM], 20 February 2017), 174, https://shop.fibl.org/CHen/ 
mwdownloads/download/link/id/785/?ref=1 (accessed 22 June 
2019). 
8 Myrthe van der Gaast, Tunisia: Business Opportunity Report, 
Agriculture (The Hague: Netherlands-African Business Council 
[NABC], February 2018), 12. 
9 Technical Center of Organic Agriculture (CTAB), Organic 
Products Market, http://www.ctab.nat.tn/index.php/en/ 
(accessed 23 July 2019). 
10 Willer and Lernoud, eds., The World of Organic Agriculture 
(see note 7), 128. 
11 Han Soethoudt, Greet Blom-Zandstra and Heike Ax-
mann, Tomato Value Chain Analysis in Tunisia, Report WFBR 
1830 (Wageningen: Wageningen Food and Biobased Re-
search, June 2018), 19. 
12 Boubaker Thabet, Abderraouf Laajimi, Chokri Thabet 
and Moncef Bensaïd, “Agricultural and Food Policies in 
Tunisia: From a Seemingly Solid Performance to Unsustaina-
ble Revealed Achievements”, in Sustainable Agricultural Devel-
opment: Challenges and Approaches in Southern and Eastern Medi-
terranean Countries, ed. Michel Petit et al. (Cham: Springer, 
2015), 83–101 (96). 
Germany is about 5 percent.13 The poor state of the 
transport system tends to discourage logistics and 
processing companies from locating in rural areas. 
Additionally, poor households and rural micro-enter-
prises have little access to sources of finance. 
The export sector is traditionally heavily monopo-
lised, with significant effects through to the present. 
To this day monopolisation hinders smaller innova-
tive firms from entering the market entry, which also 
makes it harder to create new jobs.14 Olive oil for 
example is exported exclusively by the state authority 
Office National de l’Huile (ONH). 
Regional agricultural trade is small in volume and lacking 
diversification: Certain Tunisian products are inter-
nationally competitive and exportable. According to 
the World Bank’s Revealed Comparative Advantage 
(RCA) index this applies primarily to labour-intensive 
products that require comparatively little land and 
water: olive oil, tomatoes, oranges and potatoes are 
worth producing. Vegetables are even competitive 
with French (but not Moroccan) produce.15 Products 
of animal origin like meat and milk are not inter-
nationally competitive, and wheat only in particular 
regions.16 
At 2 percent, North Africa’s regional 
trade is the world’s smallest. 
Tunisia’s most important trading partner remains 
the EU, which receives 80 percent of all Tunisian 
 
13 Sweepnet and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Report on the Solid Waste Management 
in Tunisia (Tunis and Bonn, April 2014), https://www.retech-
germany.net/fileadmin/retech/05_mediathek/laender 
informationen/Tunesien_laenderprofile_sweep_net.pdf; 
Steffen Noleppa and Matti Cartsburg, Das große Wegschmeißen: 
Vom Acker bis zum Verbraucher: Ausmaß und Umwelteffekte der 
Lebensmittelverschwendung in Deutschland (Berlin: World Wide 
Fund for Nature [WWF] Deutschland, June 2015), https:// 
www.wwf.de/fileadmin/fm-wwf/Publikationen-PDF/WWF_ 
Studie_Das_grosse_Wegschmeissen.pdf (accessed 23 July 2019). 
14 Antonio Nucifora and Bob Rijkers, The Unfinished Revolu-
tion: Bringing Opportunity, Good Jobs and Greater Wealth to All 
Tunisians (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, May 2014), 69. 
15 World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), “Revealed Com-
parative Advantage, by Country, Food Products, to World 
2009–2013”, https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/ 
Country/BY-COUNTRY/StartYear/2009/EndYear/2013/TradeFlow/ 
Export/Indicator/RCA/Partner/WLD/Product/16-24_FoodProd 
(accessed 1 October 2019). 
16 Nucifora and Rijkers, The Unfinished Revolution 
(see note 14), 261. 
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exports, even if other actors like the United States 
and Arab states are catching up in relative terms 
(see Figure 1). Olive oil is by far the most important 
agricultural export product. Its holds a strong market 
share in the EU, which sources 60 percent of its olive 
oil imports from Tunisia. Citrus fruits and dates are 
also significant agricultural export products.17 But as 
a whole Tunisia is marginal in the EU’s agricultural 
trade, where its share is currently less than 1 percent. 
Germany is Tunisia’s tenth-largest trading partner, be-
hind Italy, France and Spain. The EU exports grains – 
primarily wheat – and processed food to Tunisia. 
Regional trade within North Africa is also insignifi-
cant: its share of less than 2 percent is the smallest of 
 
17 UNCTADstat database. 
any world region.18 Intra-regional trade in food is 
especially small in North Africa.19 
Raw products for foreign food industries are an 
important Tunisian export, whereas there are almost 
no exports of processed food products. Nor is there 
much processing of imported foreign products in 
Tunisia.20 The consequence of this is weak value crea-
tion in Tunisia, which in turn prevents the emer-
gence of high-quality and better-paid employment. 
 
18 By comparison, intra-regional trade accounted for 12 per-
cent of total African trade in 2017; within the Southern Afri-
can Development Community (SADC) the figure was 20 per-
cent. IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa: Recovery 
amid Elevated Uncertainty (Washington, D.C., April 2019), 41. 
19 Ibid., 42. 
20 OECD.Stat, Trade in Value Added (TiVA) – Origin of Value 
Added in Gross Exports, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx? 
DataSetCode=TIVA2015_C2 (accessed 1 October 2019). 
Figure 1 
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One cause of this lies in the weakness of Tunisian 
processing industries. 
Smuggling is an important source of 
income in the Libyan border region. 
Significant illegal trade with Libya and Algeria: Smug-
gling has always played an important role in Tunisia, 
and appears to have expanded further since the 
2010/11 revolution. It is estimated that about half of 
all bilateral trade with Libya is illegal, corresponding 
to an annual volume of about €360 million. About 
thirty thousand people in the border region earn 
their living through this form of trade.21 Food is the 
second-largest category of good smuggled, after fuel. 
Smuggling is in fact heavily institutionalised: not in 
the sense of state authority, but with clear rules for 
participants.22 The trade is driven by cross-border 
price differentials created by differences in tariffs and 
agricultural subsidies.23 As well as causing a loss of 
customs revenues, it also creates a danger of growing 
corruption. In the case of smuggled food there are 
also health risks, for example where hygiene stand-
ards are inadequately enforced. 
Little foreign direct investment (FDI) in agriculture: 
The EU is the largest investor with more than 85 per-
cent of total FDI in Tunisia and investments by three 
thousand European companies.24 The principal 
sources of FDI are France, the Netherlands and the 
United Arab Emirates.25 
 
21 See Grégory Chauzal and Sofia Zavagli, Post-Revolutionary 
Discontent and F(r)actionalisation in the Maghreb: Managing the 
Tunisia-Libya Border Dynamics, Clingendael Report (The Hague, 
August 2016). 
22 Max Gallien, “Informal Institutions and the Regulation 
of Smuggling in North Africa”, Perspectives on Politics (2019): 7. 
23 Lotfi Ayadi, Nancy Benjamin, Sami Bensassi and Gaël 
Raballand, “An Attempt to [sic] Estimating Informal Trade 
across Tunisia’s Land Borders”, Articulo – Journal of Urban 
Research 10 (2014), Border Markets, http://articulo.revues.org/ 
2549 (accessed 24 October 2019). 
24 European Commission, “EU and Tunisia Work to 
Strengthen Their Privileged Partnership”, press release, 
Brussels, 15 May 2019. 
25 Van der Gaast, Tunisia Business Opportunity Report, Agri-
culture (see note 8), 10. 
But little of this goes into Tunisian agriculture. In 
2016 just $320 million – less than 1 percent of total 
FDI – went into the farming sector.26 
Ecological Challenges 
In 2004 the World Bank estimated the overall cost 
of environmental degradation in Tunisia to be 2.1 
percent of GDP. The costs arise principally through 
“water-related diseases resulting from lack of sani-
tation in rural areas”. These effects can be caused by 
agriculture. But the soil is also endangered,27 with 
increasing salt concentration recorded in soil and 
groundwater in the past decades.28 
Climate challenges: Only half of Tunisia’s land is 
suitable for agriculture, which increases the pressure 
on agricultural resources when climate shifts occur.29 
Regions like the North-West are especially affected, 
because low agricultural productivity and the lack of 
other sources of income are frequently already lead-
ing to overuse of the natural resources.30 Grain pro-
duction – which is important for food security and 
animal feed – is especially vulnerable to drought. 
The Tunisian farmers’ organisation estimated that the 
2015/16 drought caused losses of almost €250 million 
through crop failure; olive oil production alone fell 
by 28 percent.31 
Water shortage: Population growth, agricultural and 
industrial expansion, and poor water management all 
exacerbate the fundamental scarcity of water. Accord-
ing to the “Water Scarcity Clock” more than half of 
Tunisian’s population already in lives in regions with 
water scarcity; the figure is forecast to rise to 60 per-
 
26 UNCTAD, Country Fact Sheet: Tunisia, https://unctad.org/ 
sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2019/wir19_fs_tn_en.pdf (accessed 
1 October 2019). 
27 World Bank, Tunisia: Systematic Country Diagnostic 
(Washington, D.C., June 2015), 81. 
28 Dorte Verner et al., Climate Variability, Drought, and 
Drought Management in Tunisia’s Agricultural Sector (Washing-
ton, D.C.: World Bank, October 2018), 27. 
29 FAOSTAT, Tunisia, http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/ 
#country/222 (accessed 9 August 2019). 
30 World Bank, Tunisia: Systematic Country Diagnostic 
(see note 27), 81. 
31 Verbal information, Tunisian Union of Agriculture and 
Fisheries (Union Tunisienne de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche, 
UTAP), Tunis, 17 April 2019. 
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cent by 2030.32 Although only 7 percent of Tunisian 
agricultural land is irrigated, agriculture accounts 
for a large proportion of commercial water use.33 
Climate change can make drought more likely, 
forcing farmers to rely on groundwater if surface 
water can no longer satisfy their needs. That would 
further increase the pressure on already over-
pumped aquifers.34 
Social Sensitivity 
Precarity in agriculture: At about 15 percent, the pro-
portion of the Tunisian workforce employed in agri-
culture is somewhat lower than the average for the 
Middle East and North Africa region (MENA).35 But 
less than 5 percent of the workforce is in the higher-
skilled sector of agricultural processing.36 The agri-
cultural workforce is also ageing, with 40 percent 
older than 60 years, while in general youth unem-
ployment – at more than 30 percent in 2018 – is 
more than double the overall unemployment rate.37 
Nevertheless agriculture is an important source of 
employment for young people in rural areas, where 
it accounts for 22 percent of all jobs.38 But more than 
half the young people employed in agriculture are 
day labourers without social insurance.39 
Formally Tunisia guarantees a minimum wage, at 
a level equivalent to about €4 (13.74 dinars) per work-
ing day for those aged eighteen and over – but only 
 
32 World Data Lab, Water Scarcity Clock (supported by Ger-
man Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment), https://worldwater.io/ (accessed 24 October 2019). 
33 Verner et al., Climate Variability, Drought, and Drought 
Management in Tunisia’s Agricultural Sector (see note 28), 42. 
34 Nuno Santos and Iride Ceccacci, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco 
and Tunisia: Key Trends in the Agrifood Sector (Rome: Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO], 2015), 
66. 
35 International Labour Organization (ILO), ILOSTAT Data-
base, “Employment in Agriculture (% of Total Employment) 
(Modeled ILO Estimate) – Tunisia” (Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, April 2019), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=TN (accessed 23 July 2019). 
36 Economist Intelligence Unit, Tunisia Country Report 
(see note 1), 10. 
37 ILO, ILOSTAT Database, “Unemployment, Youth Total 
(% of Total Labor Force Ages 15–24) (Modeled ILO Estimate) 
– Tunisia”, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=TN (accessed 21 June 2019). 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
for workers with permanent contracts. This is hardly 
the reality of work in agriculture, which is often 
seasonal.40 
Changing consumption habits and waste: Especially 
in the urban centres tastes are shifting away from 
traditional cereals to more vegetables and animal 
products like milk and yoghurt,41 which are not 
produced in sufficient quantities domestically and 
must therefore be imported. In a relatively new and 
unwelcome trend the proportion of the population 
that is overweight has doubled since 2000 to reach 
about 27 percent in 2016. Young people are especially 
affected,42 with the proportion overweight reaching 
about one quarter (which is higher than in Germa-
ny).43 The amount of food discarded by households 
has also increased, today accounting for one third of 
total food waste (including post-harvest losses in agri-
culture and distribution). Tunisian households waste 
almost 70 kilograms per person and year – consider-
ably more than in Germany where the figure is about 
50 kilograms.44 Particularly in urban areas bread and 
milk products – both of which are state-subsidised – 
are the two largest sources of wastage.45 
Strong sensitivity to consumer 
price increases not always backed 
by evidence. 
Supply risks through inflation: Although the Global 
Hunger Index does not classify Tunisia as susceptible 
 
40 Verbal information, UTAP, Tunis, 18 April 2019. 
41 Roberta Callieris, Sahar Brahim and Rocco Roma, “Dif-
ferent Consumer Behaviours for Organic Food in Tunisia: 
A Cluster Analysis Application”, New Medit, no. 2 (2016):  
53–62 (54). 
42 World Health Organization, “Overweight (BMI-for-age 
+1 SD) in School-age Children and Adolescents 5–19 Years 
(%)”, in Global Nutrition Monitoring Framework Country Profile: 
Tunisia (Nutrition Landscape Information System [NLiS], 
2016), http://apps.who.int/nutrition/landscape/global-
monitoring-framework?ISO=tun (accessed 17 July 2019). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Khaled Sassi et al., “Food Wastage by Tunisian House-
holds”, International Journal AgroFor 1, no. 1 (2016): 172–81 
(173); FAO Regional Office for Near East and North Africa, 
“Conference on ‘Food Waste in Tunisia: Challenges and 
Ways to Reduce’”, Tunis, 13 December 2018, www.fao.org/ 
neareast/news/view/en/c/1177554/ (accessed 1 October 2019). 
45 Ibid., 179. See also the section on “Agricultural Policy” 
in this volume, pp. 14–17. 
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to food supply crisis,46 the numbers who are under-
nourished and underweight have been rising again 
since 2014.47 On average Tunisian households spend 
almost 30 percent of their income on food, more 
than for housing, electricity or water.48 Food prices 
are therefore a decisive aspect of the standard of 
living as a whole. This means that prices increases are 
extremely politically sensitive – even if the sensibil-
ity does not always appear to be evidence-based: For 
example the unprecedented international commodity 
spikes in 2008 and 2011 affected consumer prices in 
Tunisia a great deal less dramatically than in other 
MENA states such as Egypt. Nevertheless concern 
about food prices remains a decisive motive for Tuni-
sia’s protectionist agricultural policy.49 
Land rights: Property ownership blends customary 
law with Islamic and European law, with significant 
variability in enforceability. This is especially prob-
lematic in the relation to the large proportion of un-
registered land. There is a complex mix of individual 
and collective ownership, private and public land. 
The land in public ownership originates from differ-
ent phases of land transformation and expropriation 
(see Box 1, p. 29). Under Islamic law private property 
can also be transferred into public ownership 
(“habous”) for charitable or social purposes, such as 
food security for example after a drought.50 
Rural poverty and migration: Absolute poverty was 
already declining before the 2010/11 revolution, and 
had fallen to less than 1 percent of the population,51 
 
46 Klaus von Grebmer et al., Welthunger-Index 2018: Flucht, 
Vertreibung und Hunger (Dublin and Bonn: Concern World-
wide and Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, October 2018). 
47 FAOSTAT, Tunisia (see note 29). 
48 Statistiques Tunisie, Flash: Consommation et niveau de vie 
(Tunis: Institut National de la Statistique [INS], December 
2016). 
49 Steffen Angenendt and Bettina Rudloff, Mehr als sieben 
magere Jahre? Nahrungsmittelkrisen und Hungerunruhen als neues 
politisches Risiko, SWP-Aktuell 8/2011 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, February 2011). See also the section on 
“Agricultural Policy” in this volume, pp. 14–17. 
50 Mondher Fetoui et al., Assessing Impacts of Land Policies on 
the Production Systems and Livelihoods in the South-East of Tunisia 
(n. p.: CGIAR/ICARDA, December 2014). 
51 The official poverty line in 2010 was defined as annual 
per-capita consumption of 1277 dinars (about €635) in urban 
areas and 820 Dinar (about €432) in rural areas. Statistiques 
Tunisie, Measuring Poverty, Inequalities and Polarization in Tunisia 
2000–2010 (Tunis: National Institute of Statistics, November 
2012), 7. 
tending to be concentrated in rural regions.52 In fact 
the poverty risk can be assumed to be higher in fami-
lies where the main earner works in agriculture, 
because its weather dependency makes it an unreli-
able source of income and additionally there are 
rising input costs for fuel and fertiliser.53 There is also 
significant regional variation in rural poverty: The 
poverty rate in the North-East, which is rich in natu-
ral resources, is considerably lower than in the moun-
tainous Centre-West. Rural poverty is also manifested 
in inadequate infrastructure: Only 39 percent of the 
rural population have access to transport, only 55 
percent have piped water.54 These imbalances gener-
ate rural-urban migration on a scale comparable to 
emigration abroad. The United Nations estimates the 
figure at about twenty thousand for the period 2015 
to 2020.55 The phenomenon where young people in 
particular move first to the cities and then emigrate 
abroad makes it harder to recruit young skilled 
workers in rural areas,56 especially in agriculture 
which is already regarded as unattractive.57 
Labour standards and equality: Even before the 2010/ 
11 revolution Tunisia was regarded as a pioneer of 
human rights and equality in North Africa, at least 
in formal terms. The Tunisian constitution adopted 
in 2014 explicitly grants equal rights to women and 
men.58 Tunisia has also ratified all eight core labour 
standards of the International Labour Organisation.59 
 
52 World Bank, Tunisia: Systematic Country Diagnostic 
(see note 27), 28. 
53 Further details in Samir Ghazouani and Mohamed 
Goaied, The Determinants of Urban and Rural Poverty in Tunisia, 
Working Paper 0126 (Cairo: Economic Research Forum, 
January 2001). 
54 World Bank, Tunisia: Systematic Country Diagnostic 
(see note 27), xv, 7. 
55 United Nations, Population Division, Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects 2019, 
https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Migration/ 
(accessed 31 October 2019). 
56 Hamed Daly, Tunisia Case Study: Prepared for FAO as Part of 
the State of the World’s Forests 2016 (SOFO) (Rome: FAO, 2016), 
http://www.fao.org/3/a-C0185e.pdf (accessed 2 October 2019). 
57 Verbal information, Import Promotion Desk (IPD) of 
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, Brussels, 1 March 2019. 
58 Lindsay J. Benstead, “Do Female Local Councilors Im-
prove Women’s Representation?” Journal of the Middle East and 
Africa 10, no. 2 (2019): 95–119. 
59 ILO, Regions and Countries: Tunisia, https://www.ilo.org/ 
gateway/faces/home/ctryHome?locale=EN&countryCode= 
TUN&_adf.ctrl-state=br5v0h2ey_9 (accessed 1 October 2019). 
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Political participation by women is strong. At the last 
parliamentary election seventy women were elected 
(30 percent of the seats), a higher proportion than in 
the parliaments of France, the United Kingdom or the 
United States.60 
In reality however, discrimination is still wide-
spread,61 in part because it is rooted in traditional and 
religious gender roles. The proportion of women in 
the agricultural sector has fallen since 2006, from 20 
to 11 percent.62 But women are frequently missed by 
the statistics because they often work as domestics 
or seasonal workers. It is estimated that women make 
up 90 percent of the workforce involved in the olive 
harvest.63 The poor contractual conditions prevalent 
for seasonal work are another reason why women 
earn less than men.64 It is also considerably more dif-
ficult for women to access financial services or land; 
they own less agricultural land and are still disadvant-
aged in inheritance law.65 
 
60 ILO, Women’s and Youth Empowerment in Rural Tunisia: An 
Assessment Using the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index 
(WEAI), Taqeem Impact Report Series 11 (Geneva, May 2018), 7. 
61 For example United Nations, Consideration of Reports Sub-
mitted by States Parties under Article 18 of the Convention: Conclud-
ing Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion against Women: Tunisia, CEDAW/C/TUN/CO/6, Forty-Sev-
enth Session, 4–22 October 2010 (New York, 5 November 
2010), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/ 
treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW/C/ 
TUN/CO/6&Lang=En (accessed 19 October 2019). 
62 ILO, ILOSTAT Database, “Employment in Agriculture, 
Female (% of Female Employment) (Modeled ILO Estimate) – 
Tunisia” (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, April 2018), 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.FE.ZS? 
locations=TN (accessed 1 July 2019). 
63 Isabel Putinja, “Tunisian Women Producers Making a 
Mark in a Man’s World”, Olive Oil Times, 17 September 2018, 
https://www.oliveoiltimes.com/olive-oil-business/tunisian-
women-producers-making-a-mark-in-a-mans-world/64329 
(accessed 23 July 2019). 
64 Verbal information, UTAP, Tunis, 18 April 2019. 
65 Freedom House, Women’s Rights in the Middle East and 
North Africa 2010 – Tunisia, 3 March 2010, https://www. 
refworld.org/docid/4b99011cc.html (accessed 29 October 
2019). 
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Tunisia’s economic policy leans state-led and protec-
tionist. One manifestation of this is state export mo-
nopolies and state control of consumer prices. The 
principal state influences on Tunisia’s rural areas and 
agriculture sector are agricultural policy and trade 
and investment policy. 
Agricultural Policy 
Tunisia’s agricultural policy combines two principal 
objectives: export concentration and self-reliance. 
This means subsidising domestic production of prod-
ucts that are not internationally competitive – such 
as grain and animal feed – in order to promote 
domestic production and substitute imports. Never-
theless imports still represent an especially high share 
of consumption of these products with almost 70 per-
cent (cereals) and 40 percent (food of animal origin).66 
As well as subsidies, tariffs are also employed to pro-
tect Tunisia’s agricultural markets and stimulate do-
mestic production in the interests of supply security.67 
Tunisia’s agricultural policy 
pursues self-sufficiency and 
export concentration. 
Since the 1980s Tunisia has been increasingly 
opening its markets in order to satisfy WTO rules and 
the terms of World Bank and IMF programmes. The 
Agricultural Sector Adjustment Programme (PASA) 
serves this purpose. Some state monopolies have been 
dissolved and agricultural productivity has been im-
 
66 Elena Ianchovichina, Josef Loening and Christina Wood, 
How Vulnerable Are Arab Countries to Global Food Price Shocks? 
Policy Research Working Paper 6018 (Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank, March 2012), 9. 
67 See the section on “Trade Policy” in this volume, 
pp. 17–22. 
proved. Although staple food subsidies have been 
retained as the heart of Tunisian agricultural policy, 
state spending on the agricultural sector fell notice-
ably between 1980 and 2016, from 15 to 4 percent of 
total public expenditure.68 
The following concrete measures characterise Tuni-
sian agricultural policy: 
Support for producers and exporters: This amounts to 
1 percent of GDP (as of 2012).69 Guaranteed prices 
for uncompetitive products such as cereals form the 
biggest spending item, followed by input subsidies 
(especially on energy) and spending on milk collec-
tion and irrigation. Subsidies also became necessary 
to support farmers as import tariffs increase the cost 
of inputs such as fertiliser and pesticides. Exporters 
also receive support for marketing activities such as 
attendance at international trade fairs. And until 
2014 there were direct export subsidies (for dates and 
tomatoes), but these ended after the WTO banned 
such measures in 2015.70 
Olive oil is a major export product and is especially 
strongly supported, since the 1960s through the state 
monopoly ONH. Private-sector exports are permitted 
only for organic and bottled oil, which however also 
receive state support. Measures are taken to keep the 
price of substitutes low (other vegetable oils such as 
rapeseed and sunflower seed oil). This reduces domes-
tic olive oil consumption and permits most of Tuni-
sia’s olive oil production to be exported. 
 
68 IFPRI, “SPEED Database”, in Global Food Policy Report 2018 
(Washington, D.C., 2018), 107. 
69 Nucifora and Rijkers, The Unfinished Revolution 
(see note 14), 267. 
70 WTO, Committee on Agriculture, Notification G/AG/N/TUN/ 
50, 6 March 2017. 
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All North African states 
subsidise staple foods and have done 
so for decades. 
Consumer subsidies: Like all other North African 
states, Tunisia has subsidised staple foods for decades, 
to a point where consumer prices are lower than pro-
duction costs. This applies in the first place to bread, 
pasta, couscous, vegetable oils, salt and coffee. In 
2012 these consumer subsidies represented 3 percent 
of Tunisian GDP, and accounted for the lion’s share of 
state agricultural spending. Maximum sales margins 
are also fixed to keep consumer prices low. As well 
as encouraging food waste, these artificially low con-
sumer prices boost demand, for example for bread, 
and lead to higher imports of products such as ce-
reals. Producers like bakeries and traders receive 
financial compensation because the subsidised prices 
do not cover their costs.71 
The state also intervenes in the market directly, 
importing goods itself in times of rising prices.72 Over 
the course of time geographical targeting has been 
introduced in order to channel consumer subsidies to 
the most vulnerable regions.73 In the event of market 
crises the Agriculture Ministry is also reported to fix 
particular product prices in consultation with em-
ployers’ and workers’ organisations in order to take 
into account the interests of both producers and con-
sumers.74 
Support for organic farming: Tunisia was one of the 
first African states to promote organic farming, start-
ing in the 1990s and culminating in 2016 in national 
legislation regulating the field.75 Where producers 
switch to organic the state covers 30 percent of the 
conversion costs and 70 percent of the certification 
 
71 Konstadinos Mattas, Konstantinos Galanopoulos and 
George Baourakis, “Agriculture and the Evolution of Agri-
cultural Policies in the Mediterranean Partner Countries: 
Putting a Retrospective Overview in Context with Future 
Prospects”, in Sustainable Agricultural Development Challenges, 
ed. Petit et al. (see note 12), 145–69 (164). 
72 Nucifora and Rijkers, The Unfinished Revolution (see note 
14). 
73 Thabet, Laajimi, Thabet and Bensaïd, “Agricultural and 
Food Policies in Tunisia” (see note 12), 90. 
74 Soethoudt, Blom-Zandstra and Axmann, Tomato Value 
Chain Analysis in Tunisia (see note 11), 25. 
75 Willer and Lernoud, eds., The World of Organic Agriculture 
(see note 7), 151. 
costs.76 Producer organisations receive additional sup-
port.77 A Tunisian organic label – Bio Tunisia – was 
established in the 1990s and is still going strong. 
Domestic demand apparently remains weak,78 result-
ing in a situation where 80 percent of all organic pro-
duction is currently exported.79 Exports to the EU are 
governed by the regime on equivalency in organic 
products of 2009, the only one of its kind between the 
EU and an African country. In it the EU accepts that 
Tunisia’s regulations, institutions and monitoring 
procedures for organic products are equivalent to its 
own, underlining the high quality of Tunisian struc-
tures in this sector.80 
Other Policy Areas with Effects in 
Rural Areas 
(1) Investment and tax policy: Unlike its agricultural 
policy, Tunisia’s investment and tax policy tradition-
ally concentrates on supporting enterprises serving 
the domestic market. But because there are compara-
tively few of these businesses in Tunisia, competition 
is lacking and many domestic products are poor 
quality and expensive. As a result, export-oriented 
companies, which are already disadvantaged by the 
investment and tax policy, tend not to source domes-
tic inputs to process into higher-value export prod-
ucts.81 This further reduces the already low added 
value of Tunisian exports and contributes to per-
petuating low-skilled employment. Alongside these 
general business policies there are also two special 
economic zone, where (mostly exporting) enterprises 
 
76 Khaled Sassi, Country Report: Tunisia 2016 (Trenthorst: 
International Society of Organic Agriculture Research, n. d.), 
http://isofar.org/isofar/index.php/2-uncategorised/119-
country-report-tunisia-2016 (accessed 2 October 2019). 
77 Soethoudt, Blom-Zandstra and Axmann, Tomato Value 
Chain Analysis in Tunisia (see note 11), 19. 
78 Sassi, Country Report: Tunisia 2016 (see note 76). 
79 Bertrand Hervieu, ed., MediTerra 2008: The Future of Agri-
culture and Food in Mediterranean Countries (Paris: Presses de 
Sciences Po, 2008), 266f. 
80 European Commission, Trade in Organics, https://ec. 
europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/farming/organic-
farming/trade. 
81 Nucifora and Rijkers, The Unfinished Revolution 
(see note 14), 306. 
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benefit from numerous tax exemptions. A third zone 
is planned for 2020.82 
(2) Social programmes: Since the mid-1980s the 
National Programme of Assistance to Needy Families 
(Programme National d’Aide aux Familles Nécessi-
teuses, PNAFN) has supported poor families, in par-
ticular in the spheres of school education and health.83 
But it does not cover food, which is regarded as a 
matter for agricultural policy and supported through 
the consumer subsidies described above. 
(3) Environmental policy: Since the late 1970s irriga-
tion has been regulated through a National Water 
Policy. For a long time Tunisian water policy con-
centrated on large-scale water supply for particular 
regions, devoting less attention to management and 
efficiency.84 For example it is estimated that 20 per-
cent of the agricultural potential of irrigated areas 
goes unused on account of technological inadequa-
cies.85 Date production in remote oases represents a 
special challenge, because many wells were drilled 
illegally to the detriment of the quality and availabil-
ity of groundwater. Comprehensive guidelines for 
dealing with drought established since 1999 provide 
for monitoring, early warning and rapid counter-
measures. Although the tendency has been to reduce 
 
82 Germany Trade & Invest (GTAI), “Tunesien – Neue 
Sonderwirtschaftszone in Ben Gardane”, 26 March 2019, 
https://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/DE/Trade/Recht-Zoll/ 
Zoll/zoll-aktuell,t=tunesien-neue-sonderwirtschaftszone-in-
ben-gardane,did=2277208.html (accessed 1 October 2019). 
83 Banque Mondiale, Vers une meilleure équité: les subventions 
énergétiques, le ciblage et la protection sociale en Tunisie, Note 
politique, Rapport 82712-TN (n.p., November 2013). 
84 Nizar Omrani and Mohamed Ouessar, “Lessons Learned 
from the Tunisian National Water Policy: The Case of the 
Rehabilitation of Oases”, in Dialogues on Mediterranean Water 
Challenges: Rational Water Use, Water Price versus Value and 
Lessons Learned from the European Water Framework Directive, 
ed. Sandra Junier et al., Options Méditerranéennes: Série A: 
Séminaires Méditerranéens, no. 98 (Bari: International Cen-
tre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies [Centre 
International de Hautes Etudes Agronomiques Méditer-
ranéennes, CIHEAM], 2011), 71–83 (77ff.). 
85 Mohamed Elloumi, “Capacité de résilience de l’agri-
culture familiale tunisienne et politique agricole post révo-
lution”, in Accaparement, action publique, stratégies individuelles et 
ressources naturelles: regards croisés sur la course aux terres et à l’eau 
en contextes méditerranéens, ed. Gisèle Vianey, Mélanie Requier-
Desjardins and Jean-Christophe Paoli, Options Méditerra-
néennes: Serie B: Etudes et Recherches, no. 72 (Montpellier: 
CIHEAM, 2015), 351–66. 
public investment in this area,86 in 2006 Morocco, 
Algeria and Tunisia launched a regional initiative 
to establish a joint early warning system (Système 
maghrébin d’alerte précoce à la sécheresse, SMAS), 
with financial support from the EU.87 There is no up-
to-date assessment of the current state of this system. 
(4) Regional policy: The current Economic and Social 
Development Strategy expires in 2020 and will have 
to be renewed once a new government is up and run-
ning after the 2019 elections. Its primary objectives 
are to cut poverty in rural areas and reduce regional 
imbalances through governance reforms, sustain-
ability measures and promotion of environmentally 
friendly businesses.88 The strategy also involves an 
expansion of public education, and has achieved dra-
matic reductions in illiteracy and poverty, especially 
in rural regions.89 
The failure to earnestly tackle the land reform 
issue can be attributed to the way it is bound up with 
distribution questions and credit options. Different 
systems of land tenure and property law continue to 
coexist. Most small farmers still have little access to 
sources of finance: only about 10 percent of farms are 
in a position to take out bank loans.90 Finally, the so-
called new decentralisation strategy also affects rural 
areas.91 It expands the scope for more remote areas to 
pursue their political interests more independently, 
which can also have effects on agriculture. Local 
councils were freely elected for the first time in 2017 
and are to be granted greater powers (including finan-
 
86 Verner et al., Climate Variability, Drought, and Drought 
Management in Tunisia’s Agricultural Sector (see note 28), 10, 81. 
87 Observatoire du Sahara et du Sahel (OSS), Vers un système 
d’alerte précoce à la sécheresse au Maghreb, Collection Synthèse 4 
(Tunis, 2013), http://www.oss-online.org/sites/default/files/ 
publications/OSS-SMAS-CS4_Fr.pdf (accessed 29 October 2019). 
88 International Fund for Agricultural Development, In-
vesting in Rural People in Tunisia (Rome, October 2018), https:// 
www.ifad.org/documents/38714170/40801808/IFAD+in+ 
Tunisia/3aec8d17-7a70-4f4b-8fb8-6bcaa49e60ee (accessed 
23 July 2019). 
89 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), Data for the Sustainable Development 
Goals – Tunisia, http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/tn?theme= 
education-and-literacy (accessed 1 October 2019). 
90 Souad Triki, Assistance d’appui au développement de la petite 
agriculture et au développement local: Rapport sur l’analyse de l’en-
vironnement institutionnel, TCP/TUN/3502 (n. p.: FAO, 2016). 
91 Thomas Demmelhuber, Die politische Ordnung in Tunesien 
und die Beziehungen mit der EU seit 2011: Dezentralisierung als 
Blaupause? Research Paper 03/18 (Berlin: Institut für Euro-
päische Politik, November 2018). 
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cial). It is still too early to concretely evaluate the 
effect of this on agricultural questions. 
Trade Policy 
Like its agricultural policy, Tunisia’s trade policy also 
pursues the contradictory goals of promoting exports 
and ensuring security of food supply. Like most North 
African states, Tunisia applies extensive high tariffs, 
quantitative restrictions and a spectrum of rules gov-
erning imports and exports, including licences. A 
slight market opening was observed from the mid-
1980, especially when Tunisia was preparing to join 
the new World Trade Organisation in 1995. The WTO 
set maximum permitted tariffs (“bound tariff”). As a 
result Tunisia’s average applied tariff across all trad-
ing partners fell from 41 to today’s 32 percent. Its 
bound tariff is 116 percent on average for agricultural 
products and 40 percent on average for industrial 
goods (see Figure 2, p. 19). 
New trade agreements looking 
beyond the European market. 
Tunisia has numerous trade agreements, under 
which it grants specific countries more generous 
market access than the WTO terms that apply to all 
other trading partners (see Table 1, p. 18). In North 
Africa the vision of a coordinated trade policy for the 
region dates back to the 1950s, when Tunisian and 
Moroccan independence in 1956 sparked the idea of 
creating an economic community for the Maghreb. As 
the extremely low rate of regional trade today – less 
than 2 percent – demonstrates, the initiative is far 
from being finalised. 
Tunisia’s current agreements apply to a range of 
spheres: trade in goods as a whole, specific sectors 
such as organic produce, or individual aspects of 
regulation, such as rules of origin or investor pro-
tection. 
Some of these agreements create a customs union, 
in the sense of applying joint external tariffs. Others 
seek only to establish a free trade area: here the part-
ners reduce tariffs between them but maintain their 
own national protections vis-à-vis third countries. 
Others again are designed to dismantle non-tariff bar-
riers as well, and thus serve the establishment of an 
internal market. As well as trade agreements there 
are also looser general economic cooperation arrange-
ments. For example in 2019 Tunisia and China signed 
a cooperation agreement under the “Belt and Road” 
framework. In 2017 Tunisia also gained observer 
status in the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) and is pursuing membership. It also 
joined the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) in 2018.92 
These more recent agreements demonstrate that 
Tunisia is no longer fixated exclusively on the Euro-
pean market, even if these more distant trading part-
ners still remain marginal in terms of trade volume. 
In fact Tunisia is currently negotiating an agreement 
with the states of the South American Common 
Market (Mercosur). 
Status quo of Market Access 
In terms of access to the EU market, Tunisia enjoys 
fewer preferences than many developing countries. 
As a “lower middle income country” with annual per-
capita GNI of about $3,500 Tunisia is not entitled to 
participate in the completely tariff- and quota-free 
Everything but Arms (EBA) regime. And it has been 
excluded from the EU’s Generalised System of Prefer-
ences (GSP) since 2014 on the grounds that it receives 
equivalent tariff concessions through its Association 
Agreement of 1998. For that reason it cannot partici-
pate either in the add-on GSP+ arrangement, which 
offers tariff incentives for implementing international 
conventions relating to labour rights and environ-
mental protections. 
Agricultural trade between EU and 
Tunisia still not much liberalised. 
Most agricultural products are excluded from the 
Association Agreement between the EU and Tunisia, 
which liberalised only trade in manufactured goods. 
Although the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 proposed 
establishing a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area 
covering “most trade” by 2010 with an “agricultural 
roadmap” concretising incremental tariff reductions 
for agricultural products,93 this was only actually 
achieved with Jordan, Israel, Egypt and Morocco.94 
The talks with Tunisia were suspended in the wake 
 
92 See COMESA, https://www.comesa.int/ (accessed 16 De-
cember 2019). 
93 Bettina Rudloff, EU-Agrarzölle runter – alles gut? Eine Agrar-
partnerschaft der EU mit den Euro-Med-Partnerländern, SWP-Aktuell 
29/2011 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2011). 
94 Ibid., 2ff. 
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of the political upheavals of 2011. When negotiations 
resumed in 2015 they moved directly to a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) across all 
sectors (which had in interim become the EU’s pre-
ferred model). A DCFTA goes beyond tariffs to include 
other aspects, and seeks to liberalise agricultural 
trade and services too. 
While the EU’s tariffs on Tunisian industrial 
products (including fish) are virtually zero, the 
country enjoys only very limited tariff preferences for 
agricultural products. Very few agricultural products 
can be imported to EU completely tariff-free (tomato 
puree and peeled tomatoes, dates, almonds and 
certain types of fruit and vegetables).95 The average 
EU tariff on Tunisian agricultural products is 11.8 
percent (see Figure 2, p. 19) – which is only fraction-
ally less than the 12 percent that already applies to all 
other partners under the most favoured nation (MFN) 
principle. 
In terms of tariffs Tunisia is in fact in a worse 
position than other African trading partner of the EU, 
such as Morocco and the states in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The latter are parties to economic partnership agree-
ments (EPAs, negotiated or already implemented) 
 
95 Abdelali Jbili and Klaus Enders, “The Association Agree-
ment between Tunisia and the European Union”, Finance and 
Development 33, no. 3 (September 1996): 18–20. 
Table 1 
Tunisia’s most important trade-related agreements 
Regional agreements Bilateral agreements with 
Free trade area with … Customs with … EU other third countries 
∎ Agadir Agreement, 
2004a 
∎ Greater Arab Free Trade 
Area (GAFTA), 2005b 
∎ African Continental Free 
Trade Area (AfCFTA), 
2019 
∎ Arab Maghreb Union 
(AMU), 1989c 
∎ ECOWAS,  
observer since 2017 
∎ COMESA,  
member since 2018 
∎ Association Agreement, 
1998 
∎ Organic equivalence 
arrangement, 2009 
∎ Bilateral protocol on 
the establishment of 
a dispute settlement 
mechanism, 2009 
∎ Regional Convention on 
pan-Euro-Mediterranean 
preferential rules of 
origin (Pan-Euro-Medi-
terranean, PEM), 2015 
∎ 17 bilateral investment 
protection agreements 
∎ Turkey: Association 
Agreement, 2004 
∎ Switzerland: Organic 
equivalence arrange-
ment, 2011 
∎ Mercosur: Negotiations 
on an agreement since 
2014 
∎ ECOWAS: Mitglied seit 
2018 
∎ China: Agreement on 
economic and techno-
logical cooperation 2019 
(“Belt and Road” initia-
tive) 
∎ 41 bilateral investment 
protection agreements 
a Signed by Jordan, Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco. 
b Signed by Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and 
Yemen. 
c Signed by Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya and Mauritania. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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which abolish almost all tariffs on both sides, but 
with longer transitions for African countries. 
As far as trade in the other direction is concerned, 
Tunisian tariffs on agricultural imports from the 
EU are higher, averaging 32.1 percent. They offer no 
advantage over the MFN tariffs applied to all other 
partners. Tunisia also continues to apply high agri-
cultural tariffs to imports from Morocco and Egypt, 
its partners in the Agadir Agreement – yet grants 
Kuwait almost completely tariff-free access. The maxi-
mum possible Tunisian agricultural tariff is also ex-
tremely high, at 116 percent on average (see Figure 2). 
The EU grants market access above all through 
tariff quotas, where defined volumes of a product can 
be imported tariff-free. Once the quota has been used 
up tariffs apply. This arrangement is used in particu-
lar in connection with products where there is direct 
competition between Tunisian and European grow-
ers, such as olive oil, dried tomatoes, fruit and vegeta-
bles. The quotas are generally also configured season-
ally to discourage imports during the respective Euro-
pean harvest period. For olive oil there is an additional 
option for tariff-free access if the oil is processed with-
in the EU (see Table 2). 
The EU applies a special import arrangement, the 
so-called entry price system, to fruit and vegetables as 
important Tunisian export products. The EU adjusts 
the level of tariffs flexibly so as to ensure that the price 
of imported goods does not fall below a set minimum. 
Of course this practice is most disadvantageous to 
competitive low-cost producers such as those from 
Tunisia. 
In terms of processed food (which is especially 
relevant for employment and value creation) the EU 
grants Tunisia little in the way of tariff concessions. 
Instead here Tunisia is largely subject to the same 
MFN tariff as all other trading partners – although 
two important processed products, peeled tomatoes 
Figure 2 
 
 
Source: Data from UN Comtrade Database and WTO Tariff Profiles, Country List.  
Apart from the bound tariff, figures are for applied tariffs. 
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and tomato puree, can be exported to the EU com-
pletely tariff-free. 
For its part, Tunisia takes a more rigid line than 
the EU, neither lifting nor reducing tariffs for any 
agricultural product at all. Instead tightly defined 
tariff quotas are the means of choice for protecting 
less competitive Tunisian products including dairy 
products, meat and cereals. Tunisia rejects the pos-
sibility to import these products more cheaply, 
instead pursuing a strategy of import substitution 
through domestic production. 
Beyond tariffs: No bilateral action on non-
tariff measures in the association agreement 
Non-tariff measures (NTMs) are not addressed in the 
existing association agreement. But they do hinder 
trade, especially in the agricultural sector (although 
with regional differences). The NTMs applied by 
African countries are regarded as especially trade-dis-
torting, generating costs estimated to be equivalent 
to a tariff of almost 300 percent (three times as high 
as those applied by OECD countries).96 Specifically in 
North Africa NTMs apply principally to imports of 
meat, and to the major export products of fruit and 
vegetables and olive oil. Tunisia in particular makes 
liberal use of non-tariff measures.97 These include 
 
96 IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa 
(see note 18), 46. 
97 Nicolas Péridy and Ahmed Ghoneim, “Middle East and 
North African Integration: Through the Lens of Non-tariff 
Table 2 
Importing olive oil to the EU: options and their relevance 
Import option (1) Quota (2) Inward processing (3) MFN tariff 
Design ∎ Tariff-free for limited 
volume of 56,700 t per 
annum 
∎ Increases of 32,000 t 
respectively in 2016 
and 2017 
∎ Tariff-free if blended 
∎ Labelling of origin of 
blended component 
∎ Marketing as oil from 
country where blending 
occurs 
∎ To support market, export 
of equivalent volume from 
EU 
∎ Above quota  
31–32% – 
tariff depending on quality 
Objective ∎ Limited market access 
∎ Support for economy after 
collapse of tourism follow-
ing terrorist attacks in 
Sousse, 2015 
∎ Support for European 
processors 
∎ WTO rule requiring equal 
treatment of trade partners 
Oil type ∎ All (bottled and container, 
“bulk”) 
∎ Container ∎ All 
Relevance  
(% of Tunisian 
exports to EU) 
∎ 30% ∎ 30% ∎ 40% estimated remainder 
 Sum of 1 + 2 relatively constant over time, proportion  
of inward processing rises with quota utilisation  
 
Source: Laurent Mercier, Market Situation in the Olive Oil and Table Olives Sectors (Brussels:  
European Commission, Committee for the Common Organisation of the Agricultural  
Markets, 23 March 2018), http://www.agro-alimentarias.coop/ficheros/doc/05625.pdf. 
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licensing requirements, labelling rules and import 
controls as well as numerous export regulations, for 
example for licensing enterprises to export olive oil. 
The EU’s NTMs revolve principally around labelling 
rules and product quality standards and inspections, 
applying almost exclusively to imports.98 In fact the 
EU applies NTMs to almost 40 percent of all its tariff-
free vegetable imports, which also affects Tunisia. 
What this demonstrates is that just abolishing tariffs 
will certainly not be sufficient to stimulate the EU’s 
trade with Tunisia, as long as the requirements of the 
corresponding NTMs are not fulfilled. 
It should be emphasised that although NTMs can 
have a fundamentally trade-reducing effect, they 
can also be used to address cases of market failure. 
This applies for example to health standards such as 
thresholds for pesticide residues. Here NTMs can be 
used to prevent harm and potentially even achieve 
welfare gains. According to the European Rapid Alert 
System for Food and Feed (RASFF), Tunisian foodstuffs 
are responsible for 10 percent of all food safety prob-
lems recorded at the EU’s borders. The worst offend-
ers are shellfish, fish, fruit and vegetables (especially 
oranges), all of which are important Tunisian ex-
ports.99 This points to weaknesses in the value chains 
for perishable products affecting transport, storage 
and food inspections. 
Negotiations about Market Access in 
a New DCFTA 
Because Tunisia has to date rigidly protected its mar-
ket for agricultural products, the current negotiations 
for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
offer important opportunities, especially for more 
agricultural trade. As well as addressing tariffs, the 
talks should in particular tackle non-tariff measures 
that strongly affect the agricultural sector, including 
environmental standards and labour rights. The EU 
concluded DCFTAs with the Eastern Partnership coun-
tries Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova in 2014 and is 
already negotiating with Mediterranean partners like 
 
Measures”, Journal of Economic Integration 28, no. 4 (2013): 
580–609 (586). 
98 WITS, “Tunisia, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” 
(2019), https://wits.worldbank.org/tariff/non-tariff-measures/ 
en/type-count/country/TUN/ntmcode/All.n (accessed 1 October 
2019). 
99 European Commission, RASFF Portal, https://webgate. 
ec.europa.eu/rasff-window/portal/?event=searchForm& 
cleanSearch=1# (accessed 1 October 2019). 
Morocco and Tunisia; negotiations with Egypt and 
Jordan are planned. The talks with Tunisia began 
in 2015, with the latest round held in April 2019 in 
Tunis. 
The principal political interests of both sides lie 
outside of agriculture, and in fact outside the sphere 
of trade in goods altogether. Tunisia is seeking in the 
first place to improve the possibilities for its citizens 
to live and work in the EU, and to achieve flexibilisa-
tion of visa conditions. The EU and Germany in par-
ticular, in turn, are principally interested in support-
ing Tunisia’s young democratisation movement, 
which plays a pioneering role in the region. It is also 
in the EU’s interest to cooperate with Tunisia on 
asylum procedures and in combating terrorism and 
smuggling.100 
These broad foreign policy themes can be connected 
only partially with the planned DCFTA. For example 
labour migration can be regulated as free movement 
of workers in the services chapter of trade agreements 
(“Mode 4”). But in order to have a real effect in this 
sphere, a DCFTA would have to be accompanied by an 
easing of visa conditions. While the EU does acknowl-
edge this as an objective, it is unlikely to achieve an 
internal consensus due to differences of interests be-
tween member states.101 The migration partnership 
being sought in parallel also offers openings for trade 
matters. One option being considered, for example, 
is to suspend existing tariff concessions to encourage 
Tunisia to take back rejected asylum-seekers. 
Different proposals for agricultural trade 
The negotiations on reciprocal tariff reductions and 
on cooperation on non-tariff measures are explicitly 
relevant to agricultural trade. They include sanitary 
and phytosanitary standards and geographical indica-
tions. 
Reciprocal tariff reductions and exemptions: The approach 
pursued by the WTO is to liberalise all sectors of trade 
 
100 “Grenzsicherung in Tunesien: ‘Weniger Geflüchtete 
kommen deswegen nicht’”, Sarah Mersch interviewed by 
Ellen Häring, Deutschlandfunk Kultur, 28 January 2019, https:// 
www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/grenzsicherung-in-tunesien-
weniger-gefluechtete-kommen.979.de.html?dram:article_id= 
439310 (accessed 1 October 2019). 
101 European Council, “Joint Press Release on the Occasion 
of the 15th Meeting of the EU-Tunisia Association Council” 
(Brussels, 17 May 2019), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
de/press/press-releases/2019/05/17/joint-press-release-
following-the-15th-session-of-the-ue-tunisia-association-
council/ (accessed 1 October 2019). 
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through trade agreements. For that reason exclusions 
from tariff reductions should not apply to entire sec-
tors – for example agricultural trade as a whole – 
although they are foreseen for specific products. The 
actual extent of exclusions is a matter for negotia-
tions. In the EU’s EPAs with African states, for exam-
ple, they cover about 20 to 25 percent of tariffs on 
goods (affecting mostly but not exclusively agricultural 
products).102 In its DCFTA negotiations Tunisia is 
interested above all in persuading the EU to open its 
market more fully to Tunisian olive oil. But Tunisia 
also wants to see the existing seasonal tariff quotas 
for fruit and vegetables adjusted to its benefit. The EU 
would like to export more animal products and grain 
to Tunisia. The length of the transitional period is 
also an important issue, because it defines how quickly 
Tunisia must reduce its tariffs and open up to Euro-
pean competition. Under the principle of asymmetry 
the EU would abolish its import tariffs immediately 
while the economically weaker partner would benefit 
from long transitions. European Union EPAs with 
African countries for example specify transitions of 
up to twenty-five years. The idea is to grant these 
countries enough time to actually implement adjust-
ment measures and agricultural reforms, in order to 
be able to compensate losses that can potentially arise 
after tariff reductions result in domestic African prod-
ucts being displaced by competing European products 
in African markets. Finally, safeguard clauses define 
under what circumstances and to what extent tariffs 
may be restored temporarily to protect domestic mar-
kets. 
Non-tariff measures (NTMs): Coordination and possibly 
harmonisation of standards is a new topic in the DCFTA 
talks, not covered by the existing association agree-
ment which only refers to typical WTO rules.103 One 
special aspect, originating in the EU’s Neighbourhood 
Policy, lies in the adoption of the acquis communau-
taire. As well as the import rules themselves, this 
body of European law also contains comprehensive 
provisions for regulatory and administrative pro-
cedures and – and in many cases requires the auto-
matic adoption of subsequent modifications adopted 
 
102 Bettina Rudloff and Isabelle Werenfels, Vertieftes 
EU-Handelsabkommen mit Tunesien: Gut gemeint ist nicht genug: 
Schlecht gerüstetes Tunesien und ratlose EU, SWP-Aktuell 62/2018 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2018). 
103 Bettina Rudloff, Handeln für eine bessere EU-Handelspolitik: 
Mehr Legitimierung, Beteiligung und Transparenz, SWP-Studie 
23/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 
2017). 
by the EU, for example on food standards. But in the 
DCFTA negotiations the acquis is narrowed to a range 
of products defined by the non-EU partner (“selective 
acquis”).104 Finally, the DCFTA negotiations also in-
volve the creation of lists of protected geographical 
indications which can be flexibly adapted after the 
conclusion of negotiations. 
 
104 Bernard Hoekman, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreements, EUI Working Paper RSCAS2016/29 (San Domenico 
di Fiesole: European University Institute [EUI], Robert Schu-
man Centre for Advanced Studies, 2016), 7. 
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One decisive question in the ongoing talks between 
the EU and Tunisia on the DCFTA is whether and to 
what extent reciprocal market opening can bring 
about positive impacts and stabilising effects in rural 
areas of Tunisia. 
The EU requires sustainability impact assessments 
(SIA) for all planned new trade agreements. In the 
meantime such assessments are also conducted after 
implementation, in order to monitor the actual 
effects of an agreement once it is in place. The Dutch 
think tank Ecorys conducted the SIA for the planned 
DCFTA with Tunisia in 2013 on behalf of the EU (see 
Annex). The EU commissioned Ecorys again in 2018 
(this time in cooperation with a Polish institute and 
FEMISE, a network of research institutes in Europe 
and the Mediterranean region), to assess all the exist-
ing association agreements with its Mediterranean 
partners. 
Tunisian expertise involved in DCFTA 
sustainability impact assessments. 
In numerous other studies (see Annex) a wide 
range of institutions, actors and research groups in-
vestigate the possible repercussions of a trade liberali-
sation between the EU and Tunisia. In some cases 
they concentrate specifically on the agriculture sector, 
in others on concrete proposals for the DCFTA nego-
tiations; Tunisian researchers participated in almost 
one-third of the studies (see Table 3). Nothing further 
is known about the progress of a study commissioned 
by the Tunisian Ministry of Economics. Studies re-
stricted to individual aspects of market opening are 
not included in the review presented here.105 
 
105 For example the widely cited study commissioned by 
the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung: Chafik Ben Rouine and Jihem 
Chandoul, ALECA et agriculture: Au-delà des barrières tarifaires 
(Tunis, April 2019). 
As far as the projected impacts of a liberalisation 
of agricultural trade are concerned, authors come 
to diverging conclusions. This applies especially to 
findings outside the sphere of trade, production and 
welfare (where the effects are widely assessed to be 
positive) (see Table 3). There are few truly economic 
scenario analyses that examine individual negotiat-
ing issues and areas of regulation. And few of the 
studies investigate the environmental and social fields 
which – alongside the economic – are extremely 
important for Tunisia. One reason for this is the 
methodological limits of the economic modelling 
applied in most cases. And the impact studies to date 
ignore topics of great relevance for Tunisia like youth 
employment, security of food supply and migration. 
Here only general conclusions can be drawn. 
Economic Impacts 
The findings are clearest in relation to the economic 
impacts of trade liberalisation. Opening an economy 
can lead to growing prosperity, both through a sharper 
international division of labour and specialisation of 
production, and also through technological change, 
increasing foreign investment and the dissemination 
of knowledge.106 But economic growth also depends 
on many other factors, including macro-economic 
stability, level of state spending, rule of law and qual-
ity of institutions. For this reason some authors 
 
106 Jagdish N. Bhagwati, “Export-Promoting Trade Strategy: 
Issues and Evidence”, World Bank Research Observer 3, no. 1 
(1988): 27–57; Romain Wacziarg and Karen Horn Welch, 
“Trade Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence”, World 
Bank Economic Review 22, no. 2 (2008): 187–231. 
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conclude that trade agreements are in themselves 
only a minor factor for economic growth.107 
In the concrete case of Tunisian/European trade 
liberalisation most studies predict that reducing 
tariffs would boost trade in both directions and 
strengthen overall economic growth in Tunisia. Par-
ticular opportunities would arise for Tunisian olive 
oil and fruit and vegetable products, whereas negative 
effects would be more likely for cereals, milk and 
meat. The authors of some studies conclude that 
while the purely quantitative volume of trade might 
increase its value would not, and point out that fall-
ing customs revenues could increase the Tunisian 
state deficit. 
In the EU’s formal SIA, on the other hand, Ecorys 
forecasts that implementation of the agreement 
would increase Tunisian economic growth by 7 per-
cent in the long term. It also concludes that the 
stronger the liberalisation of agriculture through the 
agreement, the stronger the positive welfare effects – 
because barriers to trade are still especially high in 
the agricultural sector, which consequently offers 
great scope for improvement. 
Full benefits of tariff reductions only 
felt if NTMs also dismantled. 
One caveat must be added: tariff reductions only 
stimulate trade where they are embedded in an 
overall trade strategy that also addresses non-tariff 
measures. Yet the latter are largely ignored in the 
analyses because their impact is hard to model.108 
Most authors agree, however, that reforms and 
greater investment in production chains represent 
essential preconditions for positive economic effects 
in Tunisia. Above all, they assert, this offers a route 
to increasing the currently small added value. 
 
107 William Easterly and Ross Levine, “Africa’s Growth 
Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 112, no. 4 (1997): 1203–50; David Dollar and Aart 
Kraay, Institutions, Trade, and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3004 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: World Bank, March 2003). 
108 The following study explicitly considers the disman-
tling of NTMs, finding it to be positive for trade and produc-
tion: Michael Gasiorek and Sami Mouley, Analyzing the Impact 
of a [sic] EU-Tunisia DCFTA on Tunisian Trade and Production, 
FEMISE Research Papers, Report FEM43-16 (n. p., September 
2019), https://www.euneighbours.eu/sites/default/files/ 
publications/2019-10/FEM43-16-final%20%281%29.pdf 
(accessed 31 October 2019). 
Ecological Impacts 
The link between ecology and trade seems ambigu-
ous: On the one hand, economic growth is associated 
with higher energy consumption, increased move-
ment of people and goods, and intensified pressure 
on natural resources (scale effect). On the other hand, 
trade liberalisation changes the structure of the econo-
my as a whole in ways that may result in environ-
mental benefits (composition effect). The upshot is 
that the environmental footprint initially grows as 
economic development shifts a country’s activity 
from agriculture to industry, or agricultural produc-
tion is intensified. But as the transformation pro-
gresses to services and knowledge-based technologies 
the burden on the ecosystem can fall again.109 Under 
conditions of liberalised competition the more en-
vironmentally harmful and polluting sectors asso-
ciated with high emissions can relocate to countries 
with lower environmental standards.110 And rising 
prosperity can also lead to greater environmental 
awareness and stricter environmental regulations.111 
Few studies of ecological and 
social impacts of agricultural 
trade liberalisation. 
The likely ecological impacts of the planned trade 
agreement with Tunisia have only been assessed in 
four studies to date, with a focus on CO2 emissions. 
They predict that emissions will grow,112 water con-
 
109 This aspect was revealed above all through Grossman 
and Krueger’s pioneering work on the effects of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). See Gene M. Gross-
man and Alan B. Krueger, Environmental Impacts of a North 
American Free Trade Agreement, NBER Working Paper Series 
3914 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Re-
search [NBER], November 1991). 
110 See Brian R. Copeland and M. Scott Taylor, “Trade, 
Growth, and the Environment”, Journal of Economic Literature 
42, no. 1 (2004): 7–71. 
111 Ibid.; Shunsuke Managi, Akira Hibiki and Tetsuya 
Tsurumi, Does Trade Liberalization Reduce Pollution Emissions? 
RIETI Discussion Paper Series 08-E-013 (Tokyo: Research In-
stitute of Economy, Trade and Industry [RIETI], 2008); see 
also Soumyananda Dinda, “Environmental Kuznets Curve 
Hypothesis: A Survey”, Ecological Economics 49, no. 4 (2004): 
431–55; Perry Sadorsky, “Renewable Energy Consumption 
and Income in Emerging Economies”, Energy Policy 37, no. 10 
(2009): 4021–28. 
112 Abdelaziz Hakimi and Helmi Hamdi, Trade Liberaliza-
tion, FDI Inflows, Environmental Quality and Economic Growth: A 
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sumption will increase through an expansion of 
water-intensive sectors and more irrigation (for exam-
ple of fruit and vegetables), and that more pesticides 
could also be used.113 The volume of waste is also 
forecast to increase, along with higher consumption 
of plastics in households and businesses.114 
Positive effects are expected where cultivation of 
ecological fragile and/or low-yielding areas is poten-
tially abandoned in response to a loss of profitability. 
That could encourage a shift to less intensive land 
uses like sheep-rearing. The World Bank, for example, 
expects intensified competition to result in a signifi-
cant increase the amount of fallow land.115 It would 
also be beneficial for the ecosystem if a trade liberali-
sation were to strongly reduce Tunisian cereal pro-
duction, which is currently a major factor causing soil 
degradation. 
Social Impacts 
Fundamentally an increase in trade can lead to rising 
income and consequently falling poverty.116 But this 
trickle-down effect does not automatically reach the 
poorest in society. A trade liberalisation is always 
accompanied by adjustment processes that have nega-
tive effects for some sectors and some workers. These 
need to be compensated by redistribution of the 
welfare gains through a corresponding social policy. 
Many experts regard a strengthened agricultural sec-
 
Comparative Analysis between Tunisia and Morocco, MPRA Paper 
63799 (Munich: Munich Personal RePEc Archive [MPRA], 
20 April 2015). 
113 Marco Jonville, Perceptions de l’Accord de Libre Echange 
Complet et Approfondi (ALECA): Etude des attentes et conséquences 
économiques et sociales en Tunisie (Tunis: Forum Tunisien des 
Droits Economiques et Sociaux [FTDES], October 2018), 6f. 
114 European Commission Services’ Position Paper on the Trade 
Sustainability Impact Assessment in Support of Negotiations of a 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between the Euro-
pean Union and Tunisia (April 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc_153337.pdf (accessed 18 July 
2019). 
115 Tunisia: Agricultural Policy Review, Report 35239-TN 
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 20 July 2006), 26f. 
116 L. Alan Winters, Neil McCulloch and Andrew McKay, 
“Trade Liberalization and Poverty: The Evidence So Far”, 
Journal of Economic Literature 42, no. 1 (2004): 72–115; David 
Dollar and Aart Kraay, “Trade, Growth, and Poverty”, Eco-
nomic Journal 114, no. 493 (2004): F22–F49. 
tor as especially effective in reducing poverty.117 In 
terms of a liberalisation of agricultural trade through 
the planned DCFTA, it should therefore be assumed 
that poverty in Tunisia can be reduced. 
The studies considered here also suggest that em-
ployment will rise in individual agricultural sectors, 
for example in the production of fruit, vegetables and 
vegetable oils. In citrus fruit and cereals a reduction 
in employment is to be expected.118 The explanation 
for these differential effects is that liberalised trade 
strengthens a country’s competitive sectors but re-
duces employment where inefficient structures are 
swept away and technological progress develops. Then 
the entire employment effect depends on whether 
the industrial sector can offer new jobs for these dis-
placed and specifically qualified workers. 
As far as the development of wages after the 
planned trade agreement is concerned, the forecasts 
diverge. The maximum discussed is a 15 percent rise 
in wages through intensified trade. 
Female employment rates can in principle increase 
if particular export-capable sectors expand. However 
increasing exports and an efficiency-driven restruc-
turing of production come with a danger of creating 
more temporary and poorly paid ancillary jobs, for 
example in harvesting or packing. That was for exam-
ple predicted in the impact assessments a few years 
ago for a new EU trade agreement with Chile.119 In 
Tunisia, too, these would be typical occupations for 
women.120 The effect of trade liberalisation on youth 
employment can only be guessed at on the basis of 
potential wage developments. The greater the wage 
effect through economic growth, the more attractive 
agriculture sector is likely to become for better-quali-
fied young adults. 
 
117 John W. Mellor, Agricultural Development and Economic 
Transformation: Promoting Growth with Poverty Reduction (Basing-
stoke, 2017), 22ff. 
118 Hakim Ben Hammouda, Mohamed Hedi Bchir, 
Mondher Mimouni and Xavier Pichot, How North Africa Could 
Benefit from the Euromediterranean Partnership: The Necessity to 
Balance the Barcelona Process, ATPC Work in Progress 59 (n. p.: 
African Trade Policy Centre [ATPC], May 2007). 
119 ITAQA SARL, Evaluation of the Economic Impact of the Trade 
Pillar of the EU-Chile Association Agreement: Final Report (Paris, 
23 March 2012), 204. 
120 Ilham Haouas, Mahmoud Yagoubi and Almas Hesh-
mati, “The Impacts of Trade Liberalization on Employment 
and Wages in Tunisian Industries”, Journal of International 
Development 17, no. 4 (2005): 527–51. 
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None of the sustainability impact assessments 
consider security of food supply, despite this being 
the foremost objective of Tunisia’s protectionist trade 
policy to date. Trade liberalisation would cause im-
ports to increase and consumer prices to fall, and as 
a result improve the supply situation. However, such 
a development would not be driven by domestic pro-
duction and as such would run counter to the Tuni-
sian political objective of self-sufficiency in food. 
Migration effects too can only be indirectly in-
ferred. On the one hand the better-qualified and 
higher-earning are regarded as fundamentally more 
likely to migrate than those employed in agricultural 
primary production. In a scenario of rising prosperity 
that would encourage the emigration of better-quali-
fied Tunisians. On the other hand new trade flows 
and the resulting new employment opportunities can 
also reduce labour migration.121 For agriculture two 
outcomes are to be expected: Employment could be 
boosted in certain sectors, for example in the pro-
duction of oil, fruit and vegetables. And if more high-
quality and better-paid agricultural work is available, 
the migration pressure in rural Tunisia can be ex-
pected to fall. 
 
121 Hein de Haas et al., International Migration: Trends, Deter-
minants and Policy Effects, IMIn Working Paper Series, Paper 
142 (n. p.: International Migration Institute Network [IMIn], 
January 2018). 
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The sustainability impact assessments highlight aspects 
of economic potential, but also identify social and 
ecological risks of a trade liberalisation in the context 
of a DCFTA. The experience with other EU agreements 
suggests that some of the identified risks of market 
opening can certainly be addressed. But in Tunisia the 
planned agreement provokes categorical rejection. 
Opposition to ALECA (Accord de Libre Echange Com-
plet et Approfondi, French for DCFTA) resembles the 
broad front against TTIP in the EU and especially in 
Germany. It is driven by a multitude of Tunisian 
experiences and traditions and operates at a level of 
generalisation that makes it hard to find concrete 
solutions. 
Seeking an Explanation: Past Experience 
with Agricultural Reforms and the 
Narrative of European Dominance 
Tunisia’s rather protectionist business and trade cul-
ture and its strategy of ensuring a secure food supply 
through domestic production rather than imports 
stand diametrally opposed to market opening. His-
torical experiences with external actors – and certain 
Tunisian ones – are also relevant, having often deter-
mined developments especially in the field of agri-
culture. From French colonialism to IMF and World 
Bank structural adjustment programmes and EU 
funding initiatives, externally initiated measures have 
often been perceived as harmful interference.122 This 
narrative of external – above all European – domi-
nance permeates all criticism of the planned DCFTA. 
Fears associated with expropriation are most preva-
lent. Long after Tunisian independence (1956) it was 
 
122 Macro Poverty Outlook, Middle East and North Africa 
(Tunisia) (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2019), http:// 
pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/100591553672422574/Tunisia-
MEU-April-2019-Eng.pdf (accessed 1 October 2019). 
still common practice during the autocratic era of 
President Ben Ali (ruled 1987 to 2011) and is in the 
public consciousness strongly associated with any 
change in economic policy (see Box 1). Moreover, after 
the multilateral Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
expired in 2005, the resulting sectoral liberalisation 
did indeed precipitate major disruption and unem-
ployment in Tunisia. To this day that experience is 
cited as an example of the fatal consequences of mar-
ket opening in general. 
Tunisian civil society emerged strengthened from 
the revolution of 2011. Today, as well as demanding 
transparency and participation in political processes, 
it responds – sometimes with violent unrest – to 
price rises for everyday goods such as petrol, elec-
tricity and food. It should also be remembered that 
influential Tunisian agricultural enterprises profit 
from the existing agricultural policies. An agricultural 
reform with market opening is therefore difficult to 
communicate, even though in the long term it would 
probably be both more efficient and more equitable 
than the current subsidies for cereals and vegetable 
oils.123 
Reservations of Individual Actors 
Criticisms of the DCFTA grew ever louder in the course 
of 2019, with both presidential and parliamentary 
elections held in late autumn. Many of the objections 
to the proposed trade agreement related explicitly to 
agriculture, picking up on real risks associated with a 
significant market opening. These concerns are likely 
to persist under any new government. In any case 
agricultural matters are always also handled with kid 
gloves, regardless of the political colour of the gov-
ernment (see Box 1). 
 
123 Dnyanesh Kamat, “Trouble Ahead as Tunisia Eyes Elec-
tions in Autumn”, Euractiv, 5 March 2019. 
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(1) Government and administration: Even before the 
election year of 2019 the government lacked a clear 
and constructive strategy, as Tunisian businesses 
noted.124 While Prime Minister Youssef Chahed and 
the lead negotiator generally supported the negotia-
tions, the politically unaffiliated agriculture minister 
rejected them from the outset.125 Nor is it easy to 
 
124 Rudloff and Werenfels, Vertieftes EU-Handelsabkommen 
mit Tunesien (see note 102). 
125 “ALECA: ‘Les intérêts de la Tunisie seront préservés’ 
promet le chef du gouvernement: L’accord en question doit 
prendre en considération les écarts de développement entre 
les deux parties a-t-il souligné”, Huffington Post, 13 May 2019, 
https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/entry/aleca-les-interets-de-
la-tunisie-seront-preserves-promet-le-chef-du-gouvernement_ 
mg_5cd937e9e4b0705e47df3c8a (accessed 1 October 2019). 
draw a clear line between advocates and opponents 
of a further market liberalisation among the parties 
represented in the Tunisian parliament. Pro-business 
deputies and entrepreneurs are strongly represented 
in the secular Nidaa Tounes party. While they wel-
come the growth opportunities, they often actually 
profit from the protectionist status quo, for example 
in the case of the major export product olive oil. The 
Islamic Ennahda is also regarded as leaning towards 
economic liberalism, but followed a course of grow-
ing criticism in its public statements on the DCFTA 
negotiations in the election year.126 
 
126 Chokri Gharbi, “Billet: Quel partenariat avec l’Europe?” 
La Presse de Tunisie, 26 June 2019. 
Box 1 
Land use and expropriation in Tunisia –  
enduring experiences 
The treatment of land ownership in various phases prior to 
independence – and on until the revolution of 2011 – repre-
sents a symbolic and widely cited example of dominance by 
external and Tunisian actors. Under colonial rule the land was 
largely owned by French and other European actors. Under 
the first post-independence president, Habib Bourguiba, for-
eigners were prohibited from owning land. Foreigners were 
expropriated and their property fell into public ownership. To 
this day a large proportion of land is state-owned. Especially 
this land, as well as areas without formal ownership such as 
collective land, was reallocated to private ownership in the 
1980s. This wave of privatisations initiated by the IMF and 
the World Bank played no small role in this process. Regional 
councils (“conseils regionaux”) played a key role in the allo-
cation process.
a
 They were composed largely of landowners 
and religious leaders, who secured land for themselves. 
The outcome was that a handful of Tunisian entrepreneurs 
acquired extensive land holdings. The extended family and 
business dynasty of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, who deposed 
Bourguiba in 1987 and ruled Tunisia as its autocratic presi- 
 dent until the revolution of 2011, profited especially from this 
process. It has been estimated that in 2010 firms owned by the 
Ben Ali clan received approximately 21 percent of total profits 
in the Tunisian private sector.
b
 
Although few of these firms were in the agricultural sector, 
the possibility of expropriation remained a concern in agri-
culture – and is still permitted in the “public interest”.
c
 Ac-
cording to a survey conducted by the World Bank, farmers and 
other small businesses consciously pursued defensive market 
strategies in order to avoid becoming identifiably successful. 
They wanted to avoid drawing the attention of the then gov-
ernment, which had few qualms about using expropriation to 
secure its monopolies.
d
 To this day a deep-seated fear of expro-
priation and inequitable land reform reinforces resistance to 
reforms in the agricultural sector. It also discourages the estab-
lishment of producer collectives that requires farmer to give 
up aspects of their autonomy concerning land use. The poten-
tial for smaller producers to expand their market power by 
joining forces thus remains untapped. 
a Aude-Annabelle Canesse, “Rural ‘Participation’ and Its 
Framework in Tunisia”, Journal of Economic and Social Research 
12, no. 1 (2010): 63–68 (68). 
b Antonio Nucifora and Bob Rijkers, The Unfinished Revo-
lution: Bringing Opportunity, Good Jobs and Greater Wealth to All 
Tunisians (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, May 2014), 312. 
 
c Moha El-Ayachi, Lahcen Bouramdane and Mouastapha 
G. Tine, “The Land Tenure in Northern Africa: Challenges 
and Opportunities”, African Journal of Geospatial Sciences 
and Land Governance 1, no. 1 (2018): 1–12 (4). 
d Nucifora and Rijkers, The Unfinished Revolution 
(see note b). 
Source: Mondher Fetoui et al., Assessing Impacts of Land Policies on 
the Production Systems and Livelihoods in the South-East of Tunisia 
(n.p.: CGIAR/ICARDA, December 2014). 
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The outgoing prime minister (and unsuccessful 
presidential candidate) Youssef Chahed, himself 
an agricultural engineer specialised in agricultural 
trade,127 also expressed growing reservations in the 
course of the election campaign, presumably for 
strategic reasons. In May 2019, even as the govern-
ment was increasingly distancing itself from the 
DCFTA negotiations, it publicly called for urgency 
in the trade talks with the Mercosur states.128 This 
contradiction can be interpreted as an attempt to 
break out of what is perceived as negative European 
dominance. But above all bilateral trade with the 
Mercosur states would involve a clearer division of 
labour – meat imports for fruit exports – and less 
direct competition in similar markets than is the 
case with the EU. 
A clear turn towards an agreement with EU is prob-
ably not on the cards until a new government is fully 
operational. The new President Kais Saied did not 
speak positively about the DCFTA as a candidate in 
the public debates during the presidential election 
campaign. Chahed was the only candidate to do so, 
albeit reservedly.129 As far as agriculture and security 
of supply are concerned, the debates also imply that 
the protectionist course is here to stay. However, a 
broader decentralisation of the kind also demanded 
by Saied in the debates might have a favourable 
effect, as might the breaking up of monopoly struc-
tures. No clear policy alignment is yet apparent in 
connection with the new majorities in parliament. 
Ennahda is the largest parliamentary group and tra-
ditionally economically liberal. But the positions of 
new parties entering parliament for the first time are 
not yet apparent. One thing appears certain, though: 
The only actor who publicly and explicitly supported 
the DCFTA in the past – the outgoing Prime Minister 
Chahed – will probably be playing a much less 
prominent political role in the future. 
 
127 Youssef Chahed, Mesure de l’impact de la libéralisation des 
marchés agricoles sur les échanges et le bien-être, Ph.D. diss., Paris, 
2003. 
128 “La Tunisie veut accélérer la conclusion d’un accord 
de libre-échange avec le marché commun d’Amérique latine 
(Mercosur)”, Leaders, 7 May 2019. 
129 Televised debates, 7–9 September 2019. 
False assertions that sustainability 
impact assessments are lacking. 
(2) Public sphere and media: Since the opening of 
negotiations the media have also adopted an in-
creasingly negative tone towards the proposed agree-
ment and have even disseminated misinformation,130 
incorrectly claiming that sustainability impact assess-
ments were lacking. Another point of criticism was 
that the export opportunities opened by the agree-
ment were too small. At the same time worries were 
expressed that Tunisian exports of environmentally 
harmful products would increase, while European 
imports could displace economically weak domestic 
structures. The debt trap was also named as a poten-
tial risk associated with growing dependency on 
imports from the EU. 
(3) Civil society, employers’ organisations, trade unions: 
Organised civil society in Tunisia is just as critical of 
international trade as its counterpart in the EU, and 
is especially concerned about the agricultural sector. 
Like “TTIP” in Germany and Europe, “ALECA” has 
become a political touchstone. These anxieties are 
shared across North Africa: in 2016 a coalition of civil 
society organisations in the four Agadir states warned 
against European market dominance resulting from 
growing bilateral trade.131 
In Tunisia itself fifteen organisations joined to-
gether to form a coalition as the negotiations began. 
Its members include the Tunisian General Labour 
Union (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail, UGTT), 
the Tunisian Human Rights League (Ligue Tunisienne 
des Droits de l’Homme, LTDH) and the Tunisian Asso-
ciation of Democratic Women (Association Tunisienne 
des Femmes Démocrates, ATFD).132 The coalition seeks 
to conduct a thorough debate about the planned trade 
agreement at national level, to strengthen Tunisia’s 
position vis-à-vis the EU in the negotiations. In the 
eyes of this coalition the proposed agreement pays in-
adequate attention to the economic and social asym-
 
130 Survey of press agencies, periodicals and online 
sources since 2015, including La Presse, Agence Tunis Afrique 
Presse, La Presse de Tunisie, African Manager. 
131 Oli Brown, The Impact of EU Trade Agreements on Conflict 
and Peace, Civil Society Dialogue Network Discussion Paper 2 
(Brussels: European Peacebuilding Liaison Office [EPLO], 
2013), 18. 
132 “Une coalition de 15 associations revendique sa par-
ticipation aux négociations sur l’ALECA”, Babnet, 16 Septem-
ber 2015, https://www.babnet.net/cadredetail-112005.asp 
(accessed 1 October 2019). 
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metries and the special things about Tunisia. Like 
Tunisian government circles and media, civil society 
actors believe that neither the sustainability impact 
assessments on the consequences of a new DCFTA 
produced to date nor those on the effects of the exist-
ing association agreement have been adequate. The 
studies commissioned by the EU and the World Bank 
are rejected as biased. 
In the meantime a civil society forum in Tunisia 
(Forum Tunisien des Droits Economiques et Sociaux, 
FTDES) has conducted its own survey of businesses 
to find out how they see the DCFTA negotiations and 
what consequences they expect. Although the FTDES 
study draws some drastic conclusions – that the pro-
cess will be “fatal for farmers” and that the agreement 
could lead to the “loss of food sovereignty” or lead to 
an “invasion of European products” – it does also 
recognises a degree of positive potential in the nego-
tiated agreement.133 But a real transformation of 
agriculture is seen as preconditional.134 
The think tank Solidar Tunisie135 published more 
positive responses to the possible agreement. To-
gether with the Global Progressive Forum (a joint 
initiative of the Group of the Progressive Alliance of 
Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament 
and the Party of European Socialists) it has formulat-
ed concrete wishes for agriculture and listed products 
that should be excluded from Tunisian market open-
ing. It also noted that Tunisia needs agricultural re-
form whether or not the DCFTA progresses.136 
Finally, Tunisia’s social partners also express reser-
vations. The Tunisian employers’ organisation (Union 
Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du Commerce et de l’Arti-
sanat, UTICA) adopts an ambivalent position. It em-
phasises the benefits of a further market opening on 
 
133 “ALECA: Trop dépendants pour freiner l’UE, trop tard 
pour éviter la casse”, African Manager, 22 October 2018, 
https://africanmanager.com/aleca-trop-dependants-pour-
freiner-lue-trop-tard-pour-eviter-la-casse/ (accessed 26 July 
2019). 
134 Hamza Marzouk, “Le FTDES recommande de repenser 
l’Aleca pour un accord positif”, ALECA, 11 October 2018, 
http://www.aleca.tn/le-ftdes-recommande-de-repenser-laleca-
pour-un-accord-positif/ (accessed 1 October 2019). 
135 Website of Solidar Tunisie: http://solidar-tunisie.org/. 
136 “ALECA Tunisie/UE: pour un accord asymétrique, pro-
gressiste et juste: Déclaration adoptée à Tunis le 23 Septem-
bre 2017”, Global Progressive Forum, 27 September 2017, https:// 
www.globalprogressiveforum.org/content/aleca-tunisieue-pour-
un-accord-asymetrique-progressiste-et-juste-0 (accessed 1 Octo-
ber 2019). 
the EU side, but stresses how sensitive Tunisia’s agri-
cultural sector is, and also complains about a sup-
posed lack of sustainability impact assessments. 
Independently of the DCFTA, it also presses urgently 
for reforms to improve infrastructure and products 
quality.137 
While the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) 
sees the proposed DCFTA above all as a risk for the 
agricultural sector,138 the Tunisian Union of Agricul-
ture and Fisheries (Union Tunisienne de l’Agriculture 
et de la Pêche, UTAP) flatly rejected it from the very 
outset. UTAP fears that EU imports could displace 
small-scale agricultural structures and points to the 
experience of the Tunisian textiles sector, which it 
asserts was destroyed by an excessive market opening. 
UTAP explicitly calls for domestic food self-sufficiency 
and as such rejects a further market opening through 
a DCFTA per se. 
(4) Trade associations and businesses: The Tunisian 
Farmers’ Union (Synagri) has always insisted that 
comprehensive agricultural reform must precede any 
negotiations wider Tunisian market opening such as 
the DCFTA.139 Individual Tunisian enterprises in the 
food sector are considerably more open to a trade 
liberalisation and tend to focus on the benefits they 
would accrue through an agreement, such as cheaper 
inputs. They accuse the government of lacking a clear 
strategy for market development. They would also 
like to see support for Tunisian national branding 
as a mark of quality – which, they say, will be even 
more important if an agreement is concluded and 
European products compete more strongly with 
Tunisian. 
The polling agency Sigma Conseil, whose leader-
ship is close to the former governing party Nidaa 
Tounes, surveyed more than six hundred Tunisian 
farmers in 2018. It found that farmers were less 
critical of the idea of a trade agreement than the 
 
137 “ALECA: Réunion de travail UTICA-Union européenne”, 
UTICA, 28 May 2018, https://www.utica.org.tn/Fr/actualites_ 
7_9_D1716#.XRNFksRCQ2w (accessed 1 October 2019). 
138 Maher Chaabane, “L’UGTT lance la ‘Coordination 
nationale de lutte contre l’ALECA’”, Tunis Webdo, 24 May 
2019, http://www.webdo.tn/2019/05/24/tunisie-lugtt-lance-la-
coordination-nationale-de-lutte-contre-laleca/ (accessed 1 Oc-
tober 2019). 
139 Hamza Marzouk, Synagri – Une véritable politique 
agricole avant l’Aleca”, L’Economiste maghrébin, 23 January 
2016, https://www.leconomistemaghrebin.com/2016/01/23/ 
synagri-mettre-en-oeuvre-des-mesures-prealables-avant-
laleca/ (accessed 1 October 2019). 
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reporting would suggest. Few of them had even heard 
of the DCFTA specifically. This suggests that media 
reporting and the EU’s information campaign have 
failed to actually reach enough farmers. Farmers’ con-
cerns are possibly also misreported. In the survey they 
named climate challenges, poor infrastructure, un-
clear subsidy policies, political price fixing and the 
state monopolies in cereals and olive oil as the main 
problems for agriculture. At the same time more than 
half expressed a wish for better export opportunities 
– which a putative DCFTA would offer. 
The assessment of some Tunisian olive oil bottlers 
points in the same direction: They see great potential 
of growing exports, especially of bottled olive oil, to 
boost added value.140 
(5) Academia: Despite multiple assertions to the 
contrary by most Tunisian actors and their public dis-
semination by the media, Tunisian academics have 
contributed to numerous publications on trade liber-
alisation (see Table 3, p. 24) – although some of these 
must be characterised more as commentaries than 
sustainability impact assessments of rigour compa-
rable to the EU’s assessments. In some cases they also 
contain extensive descriptions of the process but lack 
a real evaluation of the actual substance of the nego-
tiations. 
 
140 Verbal information at the conference of the Tunisian 
employers’ organisation, Tunis, 18 April 2019. 
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Many of the objections outlined here relate to earnest 
sensitivities in the present Tunisian agricultural struc-
ture, or to real risks of market opening as identified 
in the sustainability impact assessments. Yet certain 
actors restrict themselves to flatly rejecting any agree-
ment from the outset for electoral reasons. After the 
elections in autumn 2019, Tunisia is less rather than 
more likely to opt for a trade liberalisation. As far as 
concrete negotiations are concerned, we will in all 
events first see a phase of uncertainty as to how the 
new decisive actors will position themselves. 
The agriculture chapter will be crucial for commu-
nication in future negotiations, and for the conclu-
sion of a DCFTA. If an agreement on agricultural 
trade cannot be reached, Tunisia may interpret that 
to mean that the EU is either unwilling or unable to 
satisfy its needs, and exploit this strategically. If, on 
the other hand, Tunisian resistance on agricultural 
issues can be overcome this could rub off on nego-
tiations in other areas of the DCFTA. That would 
mean comprehending Tunisia’s sensibilities – and 
clearly communicating this. At the same time it must 
be clarified that Tunisia itself bears responsibility for 
the matters at issue. 
Many of the criticisms repeatedly expressed by the 
Tunisian side could be neutralised in the negotiations 
through corresponding provisions in the DCFTA. This 
is demonstrated by experience with agreements with 
other countries. After the EU and Georgia concluded 
their DCFTA in 2014 the Georgian lead negotiator 
stated that the process had definitely produced dif-
ferent results than the initial offers would have sug-
gested.141 Other Tunisian complaints relate more to 
the communication between the partners and the 
negotiating process than to the substance. Here too 
there is room for improvement. 
 
141 Christian Hanelt and Miriam Kosmehl, Tunesisches 
DCFTA-Verhandlungsteam zum Erfahrungsaustausch in Georgien 
(Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 26 March 2019). 
Regardless of how the election results and new ac-
tors within the government and parliament concretely 
affect positions on trade policy, and independently 
of the success of a new agreement, it must always be 
remembered that agriculture is key to Tunisia’s eco-
nomic and social stability. European support for rural 
areas is necessary and possible, even if a DCFTA does 
not come into being. 
Compromises in the Agriculture Chapter 
Agreements like the DCFTAs with Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine, as well as the WPAs with African states, 
demonstrate that possibilities exist for addressing the 
concerns of the economically weaker side. 
Leeway exists above all in protecting the domestic 
market from expanding imports from the EU. Excep-
tions from market opening can be defined; longer 
(and potentially very long) transition periods for 
reducing Tunisian tariffs can be set for the economi-
cally weaker partner under EU’s asymmetry approach. 
The sustainability chapter – now included in all new 
EU trade agreement – can be beefed up. The two 
sides could for example jointly explore how the related 
and so far weak dispute settlement mechanism for 
sustainability issues could effectively encourage civil 
society participation in environmental and labour 
protection cases; that would be extremely important 
in Tunisia. 
Olive oil exports offer an important and highly sym-
bolic opportunity. Simply in order to increase sales it 
would not in fact be necessary to increase the quota; 
olive oil outside the quota reaches the EU market 
tariff-free under the inward processing arrangement 
(see Table 2, p. 20). But the measure would still make 
sense from the perspective of marketing strategy and 
on account of the product’s great political symbolism. 
The EU should therefore propose the introduction of 
an additional quota specially for bottled oil and cer-
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tified organic oil. Tunisia could present such an addi-
tional quota as a negotiating success. At the same 
time Greek, Italian and Spanish competitors would 
be spared a rapid flood of cheap Tunisian oil, because 
Tunisia would first have to establish the capacity to 
increase production in this premium segment. In 
the longer term the quota would create incentives 
in Tunisia for the urgently needed strengthening of 
value chains and the associated skilled employment. 
EU should offer to significantly 
reduce tariffs on processed products. 
The EU should offer to lower tariffs noticeably 
specifically for processed products. Currently there is a 
lack of tariff incentives for exports to the EU, with the 
exception of partially processed tomato products. This 
inhibits the expansion of processing chains and makes 
it harder to increase added value and create more 
skilled employment. The establishment of such in-
centives must be accompanied by capacity support. 
Tariff incentives could be especially attractive to 
exporters of fruit juices, jams and conserved fruit. 
The ambitious idea of demanding the adoption of 
the EU’s acquis communautaire in the DCFTA is also 
suited to promoting higher-value Tunisian produc-
tion. Tunisia should therefore understand the pro-
posal not only as a burden, but above all as a market-
ing opportunity. The sustainability impact assess-
ments clearly indicate that reducing tariffs can only 
lead to welfare effects if standards are also observed. 
The existing organic equivalence arrangement be-
tween the EU and Tunisia demonstrates that Tunisia 
is capable not only of integrating European product 
standards in its agriculture but also – as required 
under the acquis – administrative procedures and 
processes. In a similar way, in the negotiations DCFTA 
Tunisia could select specific promising export prod-
ucts to which the “selective acquis” would apply on 
a case-specific basis, as the EU has already proposed. 
The EU would naturally have to support this process 
of adopting European rules and regulations, which 
incurs considerable costs and requires institutional 
reforms.142 Here again, as with tariff reductions under 
the EU’s asymmetrical approach, a longer transition 
could be agreed. This appears as “dynamic approxi-
mation” in the EU’s DCFTA with Georgia. 
 
142 Ibid., 2. 
Sustainability Impact Assessments: 
Consideration for Tunisian Sensitivities 
and More Ownership 
Despite frequent assertions to the contrary from the 
Tunisian side – widely disseminated by the country’s 
media – there are already dozens of impact assess-
ments on trade liberalisation.143 And Tunisian actors 
were involved in almost one-third of all studies on 
trade liberalisation produced to date. Tunisia’s criti-
cism that the existing Association Agreement with the 
EU has not been evaluated cannot be left unchallenged. 
Firstly, the EU recently initiated a comparative evalu-
ation of the association agreements with all its Medi-
terranean partners.144 Secondly, the symbolically im-
portant agricultural sector is excluded from liberali-
sation under its Association Agreement with Tunisia. 
So it would not be possible to draw any conclusions 
for a DCFTA targeting agriculture anyway. 
The objection that the studies neglect or completely 
omit politically sensitive topics that are priorities for 
Tunisia, such as youth employment, social cohesion, 
rural water quality and food security, is however jus-
tified. This could be remedied through supplementary 
investigations conducted in parallel to the ongoing 
talks. It would also make sense to continuously evalu-
ate the social and ecological effects after implementa-
tion. And the agreement should also include reactive 
mechanisms for responding to identified problems 
with protective measures if necessary, for example in 
the form of protective tariffs. Certain EU agreements 
to date permitted the imposition of temporary pro-
tective tariffs to pursue non-economic objectives, but 
only for purposes of securing supply. It must be 
stressed that national protective policies are often 
more effective than tariffs. 
SIA findings should be discussed 
publicly in Tunisia. 
Tunisian researchers should certainly continue to 
be involved in sustainability impact assessments, and 
to a greater extent than hitherto. They should espe-
 
143 See the section on “Risks and Opportunities for Rural 
Areas” in this volume, pp. 23–27. 
144 “The EU-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
Website”, Center for Social and Economic Research [CASE], 
6 August 2019, https://www.case-research.eu/en/the-eu-
mediterranean-association-agreements-website-101123 
(accessed 1 October 2019). 
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cially evaluate actually negotiated content, an aspect 
that has frequently been neglected by some Tunisian 
research. Such studies should be exposed to open 
scholarly debate in order to channel communication 
to the factual level, rather than having them moulder 
as grey literature. A public discourse about the find-
ings and methods of different studies would also be 
helpful to neutralise the recurring assertion that 
scientific studies are lacking. The evaluation of exist-
ing association agreements initiated recently by the 
EU goes in this direction of greater openness: Sugges-
tions and criticisms sourced through public and 
online consultations could be included in the analy-
sis.145 In fact it is on the Tunisian side that that open-
ness appears to be lacking, given the dearth of 
information about the study commissioned by the 
Tunisian Ministry of Economics. 
But because sustainability impact assessments can 
by nature supply little in the way of certainty, experi-
ence from other talks is more useful for deciding 
whether negotiations should occur, what they should 
be about and how they should proceed. One promis-
ing approach is pursued by the Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
which brings negotiating partners from neighbouring 
states with which the EU has already concluded a 
DCFTA together with Tunisian actors to promote an 
open exchange.146 But first it must be seen what posi-
tions the new government and president adopt on the 
DCFTA after the government has become operational. 
Only then can the relevant actors become involved. 
Better Communication and Consideration 
of Wider Political Context 
Beyond concrete criticisms of individual aspects, the 
negotiations have been burdened from the outset by 
the narrative of colonial dominance and by negative 
experiences with market orientation, especially in the 
agricultural sector. The EU should demonstrate clear 
understanding for this attitude, in order to communi-
 
145 CASE, Ecorys and FEMISE, Evaluation of the Impact of 
Trade Chapters of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
with Six Partners: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and 
Tunisia, commissioned by the European Commission, 
December 2018–February 2020 (Brussels, 2019). Consul-
tation input via Ecorys website, https://www.fta-evaluation. 
com/eu-mediterranean/provide-your-input/ (accessed 31 Oc-
tober 2019). 
146 Hanelt and Kosmehl, Tunesisches DCFTA-Verhandlungs-
team zum Erfahrungsaustausch in Georgien (see note 141). 
cate a message of political respect. It must be clear 
that the talks are with and not against Tunisia. One 
necessary sign would be greater involvement of 
Tunisian actors in sustainability impact assessments. 
At the same time the EU should have no qualms 
about preparing exit strategies for the eventuality of 
the negotiations failing. If, despite obvious good will, 
no consensus can be achieved and Tunisia’s funda-
mental criticisms of an agreement cannot be dis-
pelled, other options would exist. For example the 
talks could be suspended and resumed at a later more 
auspicious time. It would also be conceivable to end 
them altogether. But neither side should regard that 
possibility as a coercive manoeuvre by the other. In-
stead such decisions should be regarded as the out-
come of an open-ended dialogue. And the EU should 
underline its respect for Tunisia’s decisions. 
Aborting the DCFTA talks would not in fact ex-
clude mutually beneficial cooperation. Instead of new 
rules for agriculture in a DCFTA, Tunisia and the EU 
could concentrate more strongly on existing bilateral 
agreements in order to promote the development of 
Tunisia’s economy and rural areas. Even if a DCFTA 
is agreed it would have to be embedded in broader 
reforms. But even without negotiations, progress can 
be made on these in the form of development projects. 
In general there is a great need to upgrade infrastruc-
ture, improve market access and modernise farming 
technology. Beyond this, agricultural reform needs to 
be advanced in the interests of the rural regions as a 
whole. Small farms are frequently attributed a high 
productivity potential and should receive particular 
support.147 As outlined above, the organic sector 
opens up opportunities even under the current terms 
of trade, and an organic equivalence arrangement 
already exists in this area. Nevertheless there is room 
to further expand the cultivation and export of cer-
tified organic products. Inhibiting factors here should 
be identified and removed. 
Numerous obvious and established forms of coopera-
tion with Tunisia lie outside of a new trade agree-
ment, such as administrative and capacity-building 
twinning projects to share administrative experience 
by exchanging officials. New paths could be established 
to address the charge of European dominance. For 
example the EU could promote exchange between 
Tunisia and those African states with which it already 
collaborates for example in connection with its en-
 
147 Amartya Kumar Sen, “An Aspect of Indian Agricul-
ture”, Economic Weekly, 14 (February 1962), 243–46. 
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visaged membership of ECOWAS. To this end the role 
of African forums should be enhanced by intensifying 
political dialogues. It is especially relevant regarding 
trade to consider the future vision of the African 
Continental Free Trade Area, which encompasses all 
African countries and all existing African trade regimes. 
The African Union’s Comprehensive Africa Agricul-
ture Development Programme launched in 2003, for 
example, promotes agricultural reforms with concrete 
objectives and timeframes, such as more youth em-
ployment in agriculture and more regional trade. 
Thus far Tunisia has clearly missed these targets.148 
The African Union might welcome EU support for 
Tunisia’s efforts in these areas. Support could also be 
given to a number of private-sector approaches that 
are encouraged by the Tunisian government. “Taste 
Tunisia” for example seeks to promote contact with 
other African companies and strengthen ties to the 
African market.149 Existing EU/Africa formats such 
as the EU Commission’s Task Force Rural Africa – 
which often tend to focus on Sub-Saharan Africa – 
should consciously take into account the interests of 
North African states. 
Apart from the specific substance of trade agree-
ments and agricultural reforms, improving the qual-
ity of administration and rule of law will ultimately 
remain crucial. 
 
148 “Tunisia”, New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 
https://www.nepad.org/caadp/countries/tunisia (accessed 
1 October 2019). 
149 Verbal information at the conference of the Tunisian 
employers’ organisation, Tunis, 18 April 2019. 
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List of sustainability impact assessments  
(see Table 3, p. 24) 
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The Economic and Social Effects of the EU Free Trade Agree-
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2018 (Vienna: Austrian Foundation for Develop-
ment Research [Österreichische Forschungsstiftung 
für Internationale Entwicklung, ÖFSE], July 2018) 
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The EU-Tunisia Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
(DCFTA): Macroeconomic Impacts and Pro-developmental 
Policy Responses, Policy Note no. 28/2018 (Vienna: 
ÖFSE, 2018), 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/190753/1/
1042031371.pdf (accessed 10 May 2019) 
Lorena Tudela-Marco, José Maria García Álvarez-
Coque and Victor Martínez-Gómez, “Issues in Trade 
Liberalisation in Southern and Eastern Mediterra-
nean Countries”, in Sustainable Agricultural Develop-
ment. Challenges and Approaches in Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean Countries, ed. Michel Petit et al. 
(Cham: Springer, 2015), 171–96 
With Tunisian participation 
Chedly Ayari and Jean Louis Reiffers, eds., Eléments 
pour une stratégie de développement économique et social 
à moyen terme en Tunisie (Tunis: Forum Euroméditer-
ranéen des Instituts de Sciences Economiques 
[FEMISE], March 2015), http://www.femise.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Ouvrage_Tunisie_Final_ 
V4.pdf (accessed 10 May 2019). 
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itpcmena.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/DCFTA 
Tunisia_Jointposition_may2018-1.pdf (accessed 
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(accessed 15 July 2019) 
(2) Finalised studies on the 
Association Agreement 
Patricia Augier and Michael Gasiorek, “The Welfare 
Implications of Trade Liberalization between 
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The Journal of North African Studies 14, no. 2 (2009): 
123–44, doi: 10.1080/13629380701811002 
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Martínez-Zarzoso, “Economic Integration and the 
Two Margins of Trade: The Impact of the Barcelona 
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Work in Progress, no. 59 (n. p.: African Trade Policy 
Centre [ATPC], May 2007) 
Marijke Kuiper and Frank van Tongeren, Which Road 
to Liberalization in the Mediterranean? Analyzing Differ-
ent Regional Trade Liberalization Scenarios for Morocco 
and Tunisia, Draft (Wageningen: International Trade 
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Abbreviations 
 
AfCFTA African Continental Free Trade Area 
ALECA Accord de Libre Échange Complet et Approfondi 
AMU Arab Maghreb Union 
ATFD Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates 
ATPC African Trade Policy Centre 
BMZ Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche 
Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 
CAADP Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme 
CASE Center for Social and Economic Research 
CEPII Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales 
CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research 
CIHEAM Centre International de Hautes Etudes 
Agronomiques Méditerranéennes 
CTAB Centre Technique de l’Agriculture Biologique 
(Technical Centre for Organic Agriculture) 
DCFTA Deep and comprehensive free trade agreement 
DGAB Direction Générale de l’Agriculture Biologique 
EBA Everything but Arms 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
ECWAS Economic Commission for Western Asia 
EPA Economic partnership agreement 
EPLO European Peacebuilding Liaison Office 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations 
FDI Foreign direct investment 
FEMISE Forum Euroméditerranéen des Instituts de Sciences 
Economiques 
FiBL Forschungsinstitut für biologischen Landbau 
(Frick, Suisse) 
FTA Free trade agreement 
FTDES Forum Tunisien des Droits Economiques et Sociaux 
G20 Group of Twenty systemically important indus-
trialised and developing economies 
GAFTA Greater Arab Free Trade Area 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit 
GSP General System of Preferences 
GTAI Germany Trade & Invest 
ICARDA International Center for Agricultural Research in 
the Dry Areas 
IFOAM International Federation of Organic Agriculture 
Movements 
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute (Cairo) 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IMIn International Migration Institute Network 
IPD Import Promotion Desk 
ITCEQ Institut Tunisien de la Compétitivité et des Etudes 
Quantitatives 
ITES Institut Tunisien des Etudes Stratégiques 
LSE London School of Economics 
LTDH Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme 
MENA Middle East and North Africa 
Mercosur Mercado Común del Sur (Common market in 
South America) 
MFN Most favoured nation 
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive 
NABC Netherlands-African Business Council 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
NLiS Nutrition Landscape Information System 
NTM Non-tariff measures 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
ÖFSE Österreichische Forschungsstiftung für Inter-
nationale Entwicklung 
ONH Office National de l’Huile 
PASA Agricultural Sector Adjustment Project 
PEM Pan-Euro-Mediterranean 
PNAFN Programme National d’Aide aux Familles 
Nécessiteuses 
RASFF Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed 
RCA Revealed comparative advantage 
RIETI  Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(Tokyo) 
SADC Southern African Development Community 
SIA Sustainability impact assessment 
SMAS Système maghrébin d’alerte précoce à la sécheresse 
SPS Sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards 
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa 
TiVA Trade in value added 
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
UGTT Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (Tunisian 
General Labour Union) 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation 
UTAP Union Tunisienne de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche 
(Tunisian Union of Agriculture and Fisheries) 
UTICA Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du Commerce et 
de l’Artisanat (Tunisian employers’ organisation) 
WEAI Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index 
WHO World Health Organisation 
WITS World Integrated Trade Solution 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
